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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTRIBUTION 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW* 
Manfred Lachs * * 
I am happy to be in the company of professors and students. 
I do not share the view once expressed by Sir Henry Maine, who, 
when called "professor" some years after his retirement from Cam-
bridge, said "beside the absurdity of the appellation, I think it helps 
to make people associate me exclusively with the class of purely 
speculative thinkers." Instead, I find that professors are, as a group, 
truly in touch with life's events. I am particularly happy to be in 
the company of students because I have been a student all my life. 
I am honored to have been invited by your university to deliver 
this important lecture and I am grateful for it. 
I. Introduction 
Courts have as their function the application of law. Judges 
are not meant to create law but to interpret it. In applying the law 
they interpret it, and in interpreting it they apply it. They find the 
law. But what, I suggest, is the difference between interpreting 
and finding the law? It may seem fundamental, but on closer analysis 
one may find each very ·close to the other.1 
* This article was prepared from an address delivered by Judge Lachs at the Third 
Annual Ralph E. Kharas Visiting Scholars Program at Syracuse University College of Law 
on September 30, 1982. The author gratefully acknowledges the Journal Staffs assistance 
in its preparation. 
** Manfred Lachs is a Judge (since 1967) and former President of the International 
Court of Justice (1973-1976). Judge Lachs is Professor of International Law at the Univer-
sity of Warsaw and also serves on the American Law Institute's International Advisory 
Panel for the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
and this publications' Editorial Board of Advisors. 
L/L.M, Dr. juris (Cracow), Dr., University of Nancy; Dr. Sci. (Law) University of Moscow. 
Dr. lwnoris causa of the Universities of Algiers, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Delhi, London, 
New York, Nice, Sofia, Southampton, Helsinki, Dalhousie University, Halifax N.S., Howard 
University, Washington D.C., and Simon Fraser University, Vancouver B.C. 
1. This syllogistic definition of the judicial function is properly attributed to Dean 
Wigmore. He developed its underlying principles most eloquently in his preface to a collec-
tion of essays on comparative law in 1921: 
[T]he person whose duty it is to apply the words of a statute must reexpand the 
thought when applying it. And thus arise unlimited opportunity and necessity for 
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Courts pass judgment. The process of judgment have been 
shrouded in mystery since time immemorial.2 Whether the judges 
were elder sages of ancient cities,3 or Roman Senators,4 or, in the 
modern era, whether they are judges at nisi prius,5 Justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States,6 or Judges of the International 
the judiciary to reconstruct the thought by its own standard of experience, which 
may and must often differ from that of the legislators. If we recollect the differences 
of personality and community, and add to those differences caused by lapse of times 
and change of environment, we shall realize that words are far from fixed things; 
they are the most fluent and indefinite of things. 
WIGMORE. Preface to SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD at xxxv (1921). 
2. Cf Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and in this context: 
[A judgment] is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, 
place and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect en-
forced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has been evolved through 
centuries of ... history and civilization, [it] cannot be imprisoned within the 
treacherous limits of any formula. [It] is not a mechanical instrument . .. .It is not 
a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involv-
ing the exercise of judgment by those ... entrusted with the unfolding of the pro-
cess. (emphasis added) 
3. Sir Henry Maine's description of ancient adjudication captures the timeless mystery 
of judgment: "The only authoritative statement of right and wrong is a judicial sentence 
after the facts, not one presupposing a law which has been violated, but one which is breathed 
for the first time by a higher power into the judge's mind at the moment of adjudication." 
H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 5 (1861). "A person aggrieved complains not of an individual wrong 
but of the disturbance of the order of the entire little society ... [and] the sole certain punish-
ment would appear to be universal disapprobation." H. MAINE, VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 68 
(1872). See also H. MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 24-25 (1886). 
4. See generally J. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW 100-221 (1968); Kunkel, Legal Thought 
in Greece and Rome, 65 JURID. REV.1 (1953); F. DECOULANGES, THE ANCIENT CITY: A CLASSIC 
STUDY OF THE RELIGIOUS AND CIVIL INSTITUTIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME (W. Small trans. 
1873). 
5. See Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial 
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). On nisi prius courts on the American frontier, it was 
said that the judge "paid no attention to the statute" and "merely 'decided according to 
his own idea of right and wrong."' L. FRIEDMAN. A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LA w 141 (1973). cf 
also Chancellor Kent: 
I saw where justice lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time; 
and I then sat down to search the authorities until I had examined my books. I 
might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I most always found 
principles suited to my view of the case. 
W. KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT 158-59 (1898). 
6. Cf Justice Holmes: 
The language of the judicial decision is mainly the language of logic .. . [But] 
behind that logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance 
of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, 
it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (1897). See also Frankfurter, John 
Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 229 (1955) ("Of course, individual 
judgment and feeling cannot be wholly shut out of the judicial process.") 
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Court of Justice,7 their judgments may have been looked upon as 
no less complex processes. 
Judgment is a process of mind that some claim to know and 
others continue to discover. Each judgment is either a step for-
ward or a step backward in the development of law.8 As a result, 
since each judgment is the product of the minds of several 
individuals-how each understands and interprets the law- judges 
cannot avoid being a vital force in the life of the law.9 Although 
this aspect of the judicial function often leads people to view judges 
as suspect or even dangerous, 10 and even though courts of justice 
in the international context are still but nascent, 11 judges and courts 
7. Cf. Judge Dillard's opinion in the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO 
Council (India v. Pak.), 19721.C.J. 46, 107-08 n.1. Institutional aspects of the Court also func-
tionally effect the processes of judgment. See M. LACHS, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LA w. 
183-87 (1983). 
8. Recognition of the dynamic nature of judicial decisions is particularly important 
in international law. See G.A. Res. 3232, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 141, U.N. Doc. 
A/9631 (1974). (General Assembly urges the Court to consciously develop international law 
through its decision making; cf. progressive development of international law in general, 
Art. 13, para. l(a) of the U .N. CHARTER.) 
9. "Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe and taking 
the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be a human and strips himself of all predelic-
tions, [and] becomes a passionless thinking machine." J. FRANK. LA w AND THE MODERN MIND 
at xx (1949). Referring to wider aspects of the development of law in historical perspective, 
I suggested: 
[O]ne essential point has to be made which, though obvious once attention has 
been drawn to it, is habitually overlooked or given insufficient weight. It is that 
our overall view of the history of law-or of any other branch of culture, for that 
matter-is entirely dependent on the record which has come down to us personal-
ly. Hence if the recorded facts known to us are confined by particular regions and 
civilizations of the world, it is impossible, assuming that the human activity in ques-
tion was pursued in other regions, other societies, for our picture and account to 
be complete and universal. This is acutely true of international law. 
LACHS, supra note 7, at 30. Cf. Judge Lauterpacht in his THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMMUNITY 203 (1933). 
10. See generally Rovine, The National Interest and the World Court, in 1 FUTURE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 313-35 (L. Gross ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as FUTURE 
OF COURT]. International tribunals are also not unique targets of this antagonism. 
11. The protocol that created the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 16, 
1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 379 (effective Sept. 1, 1921), reprinted in Acts & Documents concerning 
the Organization of the Court, 1922 P.C.l.J., ser. D, No. 1, at 7. For a detailed history and 
analysis of these events, see generally M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE 1920-1942 at 93-129 (1943). Cf. Moore, The Organization of the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice, 22 CoLUM. L. REV. 497 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Moore, The Organiza-
tion of the Court]; on the present International Court of Justice cf. Tunkin, International 
Law in the International System, 147 COLLECTED COURSES, HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 98 (1975). Although the Permanent Court was, strictly speaking, the first international 
court of justice, its underlying principles were rooted in substantial experience. In addition 
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have for a long time performed constructive functions in society 
and international relations. 12 
Paradoxically, at the same time that States hesitate to seek 
to proposals advocating establishment of permanent tribunals for resolution of international 
disputes that were periodically advanced from the 14th century onward, LACHS, supra note 
7, at 21-28, and some limited regional attempts which were made, e.g., the Central American 
Court of Justice, HUDSON, supra at 45-62, the widespread and generally successful experience 
with arbitration provided a firm foundation for the Permanent Court. Cf Moore, The Organiza-
tion of the Court, supra, at 497. Moreover, by 1920, over 150 arbitrations were already recorded 
in the history of international law. Beginning with the Jay Treaty of 1794, see Treaty of 
Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-United Kingdom, 8 Stat. 
116, T.S. No. 105, this formative experience included the Alabama arbitration, see Treaty 
of Washington, May 8, 1871, United States-United Kingdom, 17 Stat. 863, T.S. No. 133, and, 
in 1899, culminated in the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 
See Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 
T.S. No. 392, modified by Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536. Judge Lauterpacht characterized the importance of 
this experience: 
[If] the Jay Treaty marks the beginning of modern arbitration, the proceedings 
and the awards in the case of the Alabama revealed the full political potentialities 
of judicial settlement among States and the inaccuracy of the widely accepted view 
that international arbitration is necessarily confined to minor issues and that it 
must stop short of questions that matter. 
2 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1975). Cf also Fitzmaurice, 
The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4, Questions of Jurisdic-
tion, Competence and Procedure, 34 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. l, 26 (1958). The experience with ad 
hoc arbitration fostered a general consensus for the establishment of a permanent court. 
Even if the Permanent Court of Arbitration was only progress "from an evolutionary point 
of view" (as pointed out by P. JESSUP, THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 34 (1971)) this 
experience is confirmed by the present Court's analysis that "throughout its history, the 
development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international 
life .... "Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations, 1949 I.C.J.174, 178 (Advisory Opinion of Apr.11) [hereinafter cited as Reparation]. 
(Only disagreement over organizational structure delayed establishment of a permanent court 
of justice from 1907 until after World War I. J. MOORE, ThePermanentCourtoflnternational 
Justice, in 6 COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 82-83 (1944) [hereinafter cited as MOORE, LEGAL 
PAPERS)). 
12. The very existence of the Court ... must tend to be a factor of importance 
in maintaining the rule of law. For what ·matters in this connection is not the number 
of disputes actually decided by the Court, but the fact that a contemplated wrong 
was not proceeded with or that controversies have been settled without its interven-
tion in conformity with justice for the reason that, in the absence of a satisfactory 
solution, one party was at liberty to bring the dispute before the Court. 
H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 3-4 
(1958). See also Claude, States and the World Court: The Politics of Neglect, 11 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 344, 350 (1971) ("the dearth of litigation is indicative of the health, not the pathology of 
the legal system"). The North Sea Continental Shelf Case, (Ger. Fed. Rep. v. Den., Ger. Fed. 
Rep. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, (Judgment), was referred to as an example of the constructive 
function because the Court's determination of the controlling principles of law guided the 
States in question to a satisfactory resolution of the dispute. Baxter, Introduction, The In-
ternational Court of Justice, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 291, 292-93 (1971). 
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the Court's resolution of international disputes,13 critics accuse the 
Court of inefficiency, 14 infrequent intervention in interstate affairs, 
and of having a minimal impact on events.15 The parameters of the 
Court's role in international relations are determined, however, not 
by the jurisprudential.inclinations of its members,16 but mainly by 
13. For example, it is argued that adjudication frustrates the "function of a system 
of international relationships ... by imposing a legal strait-jacket upon it [because interna-
tional] law is too abstract, too inflexible, too hard to adjust to the demands of the unpredic-
table and the unexpected." G. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 98 (1951). "And 
in many parts of the world, it is thought to be particularly praiseworthy not to resort to 
litigation or to the machinery of the law at all, but to resolve differences through negotia-
tion and adjustment." Baxter, supra note 12, at 293. 
In this context, the observation of J. L. Brierly remains valid: "The most difficult 
disputes, those that endanger international peace, are never likely to be settled by courts; 
the disputes which endanger civil peace inside the state are not settled in that way either." 
J. BRIERLY. THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LA w 124 (1944). Against this background, recent 
efforts to encourage resort to the Court and expand its jurisdiction are positive indications. 
14. Recent developments lead to the conclusion that criticism of the Court's efficiency 
are of historical character, and even those are misdirected. Comprehensive reforms of the 
Court's procedures, undertaken since 1968 and completed in 1978 improved its rules and 
internal judicial practice. Cf Address of President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, 1971-1972 
I.C.J.Y.B. 138-40 (1972); Jimenez de Arechaga, The Amendments to the Rules of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973). On the duration of litigation before the Court, 
cf Gross, The Time Element in the Contentious Proceedings in the International Court of Justice, 
63 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 4 (1969). Finally, when confronted by extensions of time that exceeded four 
years in Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Second 
Phase) (Judgment), the Court directly addressed the issue and confirmed the assessment 
that the cause of delays rests primarily with the parties before the Court. The Court noted 
"with regret" that the "written proceedings had been considerably prolonged" by the 
numerous extensions requested by the parties. Id. at 6. Cf the pertinent comment of Judge 
Jessup: "[F]ault lies with governments and not with the Court ... [since] quite apart from 
the possible use of the standing Chamber of Summary Procedure ... if the governments 
concerned desired a prompt decision, the Court could meet their request." Id. at 221 n.*. 
Cf also Fitzmaurice, J ., id. at 113 & n. "'*. It is certainly not uncommon to find that the par-
ties themselves actively encourage delay. 
15. Since the Court can legally act only when its jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 
the Charter and its Statute, these charges are misdirected. Even if a court's judicial func-
tion is broad enough to undertake the duties of a revisory council, a role generally eschew-
ed by common law courts, Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REv.1002, 
1003 (1924), important principles underpinning the structure of international life are still 
implicated. Primary responsibility remains with States to develop the primary sources of 
international law. See generally LACHS, supra note 7, at 187-89. 
16. Various members of the Court, including this author, have repeatedly expressed 
support for various efforts to expand the Court's role. See, e.g., Lachs, Problems of the World 
Court: A Member 's Perspective, 3 N.Y.U. CENTER FOR INT'L STUDIES POLICY PAPERS, No. 4 at 
14 (1970); Jessup, The International Court of Justice Revisited, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 299 (1971). 
Fitzmaurice, Enlargment of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court, in 2 FUTURE OF COURT, 
supra note 10, at 461. Furthermore, the willingness of the Court to meet its task is clearly 
shown by individual judges' efforts in the development of international law. 
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the dynamics and structure of contemporary international life.17 
Thus, the fault lies with neither the Court nor its judges.18 Yet, 
despite its limited function, 19 and considering how rarely it is called 
upon,20 the Court sitting at The Hague, a historic, if remote and 
quiet town,21 has and does play a significant part in international 
relations.22 
I wish to concentrate on how the International Court of Justice 
17. See supra note 13. It is also necessary to recognize the very different context of 
international life faced by the present Court in contrast to the Permanent Court. Widely-
held assumptions necessarily permeate decision-making processes. See, e.g., C. JENKS, THE 
PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 1 (1962) ("the jurisdiction ... of the International 
Court present[s] different epochs in the development of international adjudication"); Larschan 
& Brennan, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Principle in International Law, 21 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305, 308-10, 334-37 (1983). 
18. The Court has responded to the varying needs of the parties appearing before 
it. In addition to the essentially declaratory judgment given in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, the Court formulated its judgment in Case Concerning the Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 19821.C.J. 18 (Judgment of Feb. 24), to maximize the 
available options of the parties within the rules of international law. In that context, the 
Court gave the parties an appropriate time limit to accomplish the sought delimitation. Id. 
at 40-41. Cf also the Constitution of a Chamber (U.S. v. Canada), 1982 1.C.J. 3 (Order of Jan. 
20). See 1981-1982 l.C.J.Y.B. 139-41 (1982). 
19. Consideration of the Court's ability to act must also take into account the various 
reservations filed by States accepting the Court's jurisdiction. See generally 1981-1982 
I.C.J.Y.B. 59-94 (1982). Of course, these reservations further circumscribe the jurisdiction 
conferred by the Charter. See, e.g., Humphrey, The United States, the World Court and the 
Connally Amendment, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 310 (1971). "The Court," he said, "is necessarily weaken-
ed, since its power to review certain cases is limited to those instances when a self-judging 
clause is not invoked by one party or the other." Id. at 312. This restraint on the Court's 
exercise of the judicial function seems to support this author's view that advisory opinions 
provide the agency for "a real breakthrough in the present approach to the Court .... [T]he 
real problem is in instigating initiatives to this end." Lachs, supra note 16, at 14-19. See 
also infra notes 43-54. 
20. Since it first sat on April l, 1946, the Court has had a total of 67 cases before 
it. Judgments were rendered in 42 cases and 18 advisory opinions were given. Cf 1981-1982 
l.C.J.Y.B. 3-6 (1982). 
21. Although some commentators, including Judge Jessup have considered the effect 
of the Court's location at The Hague as part of its problem, see, e.g., JESSUP, supra note 11, 
at 61-65, this contention is functionally related to the argument that the Court's jurisprudence 
is Eurocentric and is part of the larger thesis that Castaneda would characterize as "a garb 
that served to cloak and protect the imperialistic interests of the international oligarchy." 
Castaneda, The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International Law, 15 INT'L 
ORG. 38, 39 (1961). In fact it is much more: it is the Court's composition that plays the leading 
part in its jurisprudence. 
22. "The Court's docket tends to be light, but judgments of the Court are generally 
accepted and carried out by the parties." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES, Introductory Note, at 20 (Tent. Draft 1980). Judge Baxter cogently iden-
tified another facet of the Court's decision-making that paradoxically adds to its significance: 
"The very scarcity of its opinions leads the profession to scrutinize them with particular 
care and to distill from them the last drop of legal wisdom." Baxter, supra note 12, at 293. 
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has contributed to the development of international law. Some con-
tend that to speak of effective rules of law, while strife and con-
flict are witnessed on each continent, seems unrealistic, abstract, 
or simply irrelevant.23 Yet reality demonstrates the inadequacies 
of these arguments. Law is a vital and essential part of the daily 
affairs of nations: trains cross borders, planes leave airfields and 
land in remote countries, ships sail under many flags, States trade 
with one another, and people travel to foreign lands, make overseas 
telephone calls, send letters around the globe, and tune to radio 
and television broadcasts beamed from foreign stations. All this 
is law. Without it these routine events would be impossible. Inter-
national law, though imperfect and inadequately developed in some 
respects, is thus more than an abstract theory honored in the 
breach; instead, it plays an important role in the daily lives of na-
tions and individuals alike.24 
In the development of international law, the International Court 
of Justice plays a special role. The fifteen judges represent the 
world's principal legal systems and main forms of civilization.25 Each 
time they hand down a decision they make a definitive and 
authoritative impact on the development of law.26 Moreover, it is 
23. See my earlier consideration of these criticisms in "Deniers and Utopians," LACHS, 
supra note 7, at 13-28. 
24. The vital importance of international law in this context is directly evidenced by 
the very interesting recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Holding that torture inflicted 
under the color of law was a violation of customary international law that supported the 
jurisdiction of the United States district court over "a civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations", 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976), the Filartiga 
court wrote: "Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become.....:.like the pirate 
and the slave trader before him-hostis humanis generis, an enemy of all mankind." 630 F.2d 
at 890 (emphasis in original). 
25. l.C.J. STATUTE art. 9. See generally the interesting comments of the late Judge El-
Erian, The International Court of Justice and the Concept of Universality, 19 CoLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L.197 (1981); Rosenne, The Composition of the Court, in 1 FUTURE OF COURT, supra 
note 10, at 377-444; LACHS, supra note 7, at 186-87. See also L. PROTT, THE LATENT POWER OF 
CULTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE (1979). 
26. "[T]he International Court's Advisory Opinion ... clearly merits attention here 
not only as background for the International Law Commission's system ... but also because 
it represents the historical moment at which the rhetoric and reasoning of all discussion 
of reservations fundamentally changed." Comment, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: 
How International Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision, 23 HARV. INT'L L. J. 71, 84-85 (1982). 
Cf. Falk's analysis in the context of the South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. S. Afr., Liberia 
v. S. Afr.), 1966 l.C.J. 6 (Second Phase) (Judgment), Falk Realistic Horizons for International 
Adjudication, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 314, 315-19 (1971). Cf. also Reisman, Revision of the South West 
Africa Cases, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1966). 
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a rather distinctive court because it is called upon to give advice, 
as well as to conclusively determine conflicting claims. 
II. The Advisory Opinion: The Emergence of a New Judicial 
Function-A Subsidiary Source of Law 
It is unusual for a court to give advice.27 Legal advice is general-
ly sought from lawyers and other legal institutions.28 Hence, the 
very concept of the advisory opinion was questioned from the outset 
because the power of the Court to issue those advisory opinions 
differed sharply from the conventional, common law understanding 
of the judicial function.29 Thus John Bassett Moore, in his famous 
27. "[E)ven where advisory opinions are constitutionally authorized, tribunals are reluc-
tant to pronounce in situations that are hypothetical or abstract or otherwise not conducive 
to judicial disposition." Frankfurter, supra note 6, at 234. Holdsworth, in fact, dates this 
reluctance from the days of Coke, 5 w. HOLDSWORTH. A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LA w 350, 428, 
438 (1924) and Borchard characterized the attitude of the British judiciary to advisory opi-
nions "hostile." I. BORCHARD. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 72 (rev. ed. 1941). See al,so Veeder, Ad-
visory Opinions of the Judges of England, 13 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1900). But see Hudson, Ad-
visory Opinions of National and International Courts, 37 HARV. L. REV. 970 (1924). It is also 
appropriate to recognize that judicial attitudes on this issue clearly differed from those held 
by members of the executive and legislative branches of governments. See, e.g., Muskrat 
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (Congress authorized named Cherokee citizens to bring 
an action to determine the validity of federal acts); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER. 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION§ 3529 (1975); 1 C. WARREN. THE SUPREME 
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 595-97 (1926). 
28. Cf. Hudson: 
In general, it may be true that the giving of legal advice is not to be considered 
a discharge of the judicial function, but much depends upon the circumstances under 
which it is given and the way in which the result is arrived at. The Court might 
have developed its procedure with regard to advisory opinions in such a way that 
it would have lacked the usual safeguards of judicial action; the actual developments 
have been in the contrary direction .... 
HUDSON, supra note 11, at 511. From the beginning, the Permanent Court and its successor, 
the ICJ have recognized the clear distinction between legal counselling provided by par-
tisan advocates to their clients, and the judicial duty inherent in the advisory jurisdiction. 
Cf. also Alexander Fachiri: 
It can be confidently stated that the principles laid down and points decided 
in advisory opinions have the same effect by way of precedent as the judgments 
of the Court, and are of equal importance to the development of international law 
... it is the established practice of the Court not to discriminate in any way be-
tween advisory opinions in this respect. 
FACHIRI. THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 81-82 (2d ed. 1932). Further, the 
decision of the Permanent Court declining to provide the League with secret advice avoided 
a "death-blow to the Court as a judicial body," 1922 P.C.I.J., ser. D, No. 2, at 160. 
29. "In view of the history of Article 14 of the Covenant, it cannot be said that the 
provision relating to advisory opinions was due to the experience of national courts. HUD-
SON. supra note 11, at 485. Goodrich confirmed this view. Cf. Goodrich, The Nature of the Ad-
visory Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 738 (1938). 
National experience with advisory opinions led to widespread criticism: not surprisingly 
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memorandum, The Question of Advisory Opinions,30 argued that the 
obligation to issue opinions that lack elements of authority of finality 
was incompatible with both the Court's inherent judicial function 
and "the design to cultivate and enlarge the application between 
nations of the principle and method of judicial decision," which in-
spired the establishment of the Court.31 Concerns also focused on 
the extent to which interested States should participate in the 
decision-making process.32 Moreover, the possibility was raised that 
if one recalls the American attitude dating to 1793 when Chief Justice Jay declined to ad-
vise President Washington on aspects of international law involved in the Genet affair, 3 
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486-89 (Johnston ed. 1891); cf 1 Warren, 
supra note 27, at 108. The Court informally declined to advise the President on the organiza-
tion of the federal judiciary. Thus advisory jurisdiction was subject to rigorous criticism 
mainly from U.S. commentators. Moore, The Organization of the Court, supra note 11, at 
507. Frankfurter would claim: "Advisory opinions are not merely advisory opinions. They 
are ghosts that stay." Frankfurter, supra note 15, at 1004. Against this view, cf Lord Haldane 
in Att'y Gen'l of British Columbia v. Att'y Gen'l of Canada, [1914] A.C. 153, 162 (P.C. 1913). 
For early opponents of the advisory jurisdiction, cf the comments of Senator Borah in Wright, 
The United States and the Permanent Court of International Justice, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. l, 3 
(1927), and E. ROOT, MINUTES OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS 584-85 (1920) (Root's op-
position was limited in character). HUDSON. supra note 11, at 107-08, 483-524. Cf further 
development on the subject: Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania 1950 I.C.J. 65, 101 (Advisory Opinion of Mar. 30) (Zoricic, J., dissenting). See also 
WRIGHT. supra note 27, at 478-80; Goodrich, supra. 
30. Cf Judge Moore (the first American judge on the Permanent Court) who describ-
ed the advisory jurisdiction as "obviously not a judicial function." 1922 P.C.I.J., ser. D, No. 
2 (Annex 58a) (Memorandum by Judge Moore presented Feb. 18, 1922), reprinted in 5 
MOORE. LEGAL PAPERS supra note 11, at 329. 
31. Id. at 383, reprinted in 5 MOORE, LEGAL PAPERS supra note 11, at 329. Despite his 
apprehensions, the drafters of the Covenant conceived the Court's advisory jurisdiction as 
fundamentally judicial and to insure that the Court would not act as "the legal adviser of 
the Council and of the Assembly, a duty which its function of rendering advisory opinions 
does not involve," they revised article 14 using "the expression 'advisory opinion' ... in-
stead of the word 'advise' [to] indicat[e] that the function to be exercised is a judicial one." 
1 D. MILLER, THE DRAFTING OF THE COVENANT 391-92, 406. This distinction, was characterized 
by Hudson as the difference between the Court acting as an "academy of jurists" and a 
"responsible magistrature." HUDSON, supra note 11, at 511. The evolution of this institution 
must be seen as the perspective of the dynamic interdevelopment of international law. Finally, 
it had to be accepted that more than a single appropriate resolution of most legal questions 
is possible and that the correctness of a court's decision and its authoritativeness, in the 
coercive and binding sense, are separable. See, e.g., Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 
30 A.B.A.J. 334 (1944). Thus no one could claim today that the role of the Court as the prin-
cipal organ of the United Nations is compromised or denigrated by rendering judicial deci-
sions, whether or not binding, in the proper exercise of the judicial function. 
32. From the outset, the Court recognized the obvious requirement of justice that 
all interested States have an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., I.C.J. STATUTE art. 66; P.C.I.J. 
STATUTE art. 66. The right to be heard- "a right to his day in court" -are basic to any system 
of jurisprudence. In re Oliver, 33 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). The Court was scrupulous from the 
first exercise of its advisory jurisdiction in 1922 to give notice to all interested parties, 
whether or not Members of the League or signatories of the Court's Protocol. "Clearly the 
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advisory opinions would essentially become judgments in disguise.33 
Once the drafters of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
had decided to introduce the institution of advisory opinions, the 
Court, despite the initial criticisms, accepted it.34 The passage of 
time and the Court's successful experience ultimately convinced 
most critics of the jurisdiction's utility.35 It is worth recalling that 
object of the notice to States required by Article 73 of the 1922 Rules was to enable them 
to ask to be heard and to enable the Court to be as completely informed as possible." Id 
at 506. Moreover, this notice has been extended to international organizations "considered 
... as likely to be able to furnish information .... " Id. at 507. The record in N amibia is 
illustrative. In addition to representatives of the United Nations and South Africa, seven 
States made statements before the Court. See 1971 I.C.J. Pleadings (2 Namibia) 64-87 (Finland), 
107-20 (India), 122-30 (Netherlands), 131(Nigeria),132-46 (Pakistan), 280-86 (Rep. of Viet-Nam), 
497-505 (United States). The Organization of African Unity was notified and made a state-
ment before the Court. See id. at 88-106. Written statements by other interested States 
further supplemented the Court's record. See id. (1 Namibia). 
33. This argument was inherently unpersuasive. All judicial decisions, relying on volun-
tary compliance only, are unenforceable. Their authority is solely intrinsic. Otherwise, law 
would truly be a "brooding omnipresence in the sky," Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 
U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting), a principle as inapplicable in international rela-
tions as in any system of municipal law. See, e.g., Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of 
the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46, 107-08 n.1 (Judgment of Oct. 18). 
34. The Permanent Court's first advisory opinion, in fact its first judicial act, was given 
on July 31, 1922, less than two months from the commencement of its first session. See 
Designation of the Workers' Delegate for the Netherlands at the Third Session of the In-
ternational Labour Conference, 1922 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 1 (Advisory Opinion of July 31). 
Two additional advisory opinions were rendered less than one month subsequently on August 
22, 1922. See c·ompetence of the ILO in Regard to International Regulation of the Condi-
tions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, 1922 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 2 (Advisory 
Opinion of Aug. 12); Competence of the ILO to Examine Proposals for the Organization and 
Development of the Methods of Agricultural Production, 1922 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 3 (Ad-
visory Opinion of Aug. 12). In fact not until August 17, 1923, did the Permanent Court first 
exercise its contentious jurisdiction in S .S. "Wimbledon," 1923 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 1 (Merits) 
(Aug. 17). 
35. Writing for the fiftieth anniversary issue of the HARVARD LAW REVIEW in 1937, 
Judge Moore conceded that many of the apprehensions expressed in his 1922 Memoran-
dum were unfounded: 
The statement sometimes made that I opposed the giving of advisory opinions 
is hardly correct. I was the only member of the Court who submitted a memoran-
dum on the subject; and in this paper, I strongly insisted that advisory opinions, 
if given, should be strictly judicial in character, and that to this end, the Court 
must in each instance decide for itself whether it should give the desired opinion. 
Moore, Fifty years of International Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 395, 416 (1937). Only on one occa-
sion has the Court declined to render an advisory opinion. See Status of Eastern Carelia, 
1923 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5 (Reply of July 23 to Request for Advisory Opinion). It was con-
firmed as a general principle that "[a] reply to a request for an opinion should not ... be 
refused." Cf advisory opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 27 (Advisory Opinion of June 21) [hereinafter cited as Namibia] 
(quoting advisory opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
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less than two decades later another American authority argued 
forcefully that advisory opinions are sometimes more important than 
judgments, in international relations, because the persuasive nature 
of advice is frequently superior to force and coercion.36 
Thus, advisory opinions have emerged as recognized and im-
portant parts of international jurisprudence.37 Advisory opinions 
offer the Court a much greater potential to further develop the law 
than do judgments in contentious proceedings: the former, unlike 
the latter, are not limited to a strict analysis of the facts and sub-
missions that are presented to the Court.38 An advisory opinion may 
ment of the Crime of Genocide, 19511.C.J. 15, 19 (Advisory Opinion of May 28) [hereinafter 
cited as Reservations]). However, while retaining the discretionary right, the Court stated 
in its first advisory opinion that it must determine its own competence because "being a 
Court of Justice, [it] cannot even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules 
guiding [its] activity as a Court," Eastern Carelia, 1922 P.C.l.J., ser. B, No. 5, at 29. This 
principle has been rigorously and consistently adhered to. 
36. Even though agreements in force may provide for the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court, the States interested in the dispute may prefer to have an ad-
visory opinion which by a clarification of legal questions will aid them in reaching 
a settlement on broader grounds and which will not have the binding effect of a 
judgment. 
HUDSON, supra note 11, at 524. Cf a similar view of Judge Baxter, supra note 12, at 292-93. As 
I observed on several occasions, the Court's advisory jurisdiction provides a unique agency 
for a "real breakthrough in the present approach to the Court. ... " (Cf e.g., Lachs supra 
note 16, at 14-19). Moreover, frequently, the Court's advisory jurisdiction offers the best 
means to implement the Court's function. 
37. Even Judge Moore conceded their relevance to the work of the League of Nations: 
It is obvious that the point at which the Court most directly touches the work 
of the League is in the giving of advisory opinions, and it therefore is not strange 
that the Court has from the beginning shown its consciousness of the fact that 
it was just at this point that its independence might, if at all, be popularly brought 
into question, and that its freedom from influence should be clear and unmistakable. 
J. MOORE. The Permanent Court of International Justice, in INTERNATIONAL LA w AND SOME CUR-
RENT ILLUSIONS 130 (1924). I have frequently stressed the importance of this function of the 
Court and its impact on the development of international law. Cf LACHS, supra note 7 and 
Lachs, The Revised Procedure of the International Court of Justice, in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 44 (1980); See also Application for Review of Judg-
ment No. 273 of the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, 1982 l.C.J. 325, 417 (Advisory Opinion 
of July 20). In my dissenting opinion I referred particularly to the "possibility of the Court 
performing interpretative functions serving a similar purpose, acting upon the request of 
the Assembly or other organ desiring legal guidance as to its own activities." (Cf numerous 
commentators, including members of both the Permanent and present Courts.) K. KEITH, 
THE EXTENT OF THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1971); 
D .. PRATAP, THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1972). See also Szasz, 
Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, in 2 FUTURE OF COURT, supra note 
10, at 499; Sohn, Broading the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 
77 AM. J. INT'L L.124 (1983); Recent DevelopmentNascentProposalfor Expanding the Advisory 
Opinion Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 10 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 215 (1983). 
38. Cf M POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE 
LEAGUE AND U.N. ERA (1973). 
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be broader in scope, focusing on issues indirectly related to the fact 
pattern, so long as the goal of providing an answer to the question 
is achieved. Consequently, the drafting of an advisory opinion gives 
greater liberty to write persuasively and enter a wider domain of 
law. This broader appeal is of particular value at a time when States 
remain reluctant to submit disputes for judicial resolution. An ad-
visory opinion better serves the needs of the parties by prevent-
ing the development of an adversarial relationship, and by providing 
persuasive guidelines for peaceful settlement of the dispute.39 It may 
be worth recalling that the U .N. Charter empowers the Court to 
give advisory opinions on legal questions"° submitted by the General 
Assembly, the Security Council, and other international organiza-
tions as authorized by the General Assembly .41 These questions in-
39. See, KEITH, supra note 37; POMERANCE, supra note 38. 
40. In its first advisory opinion, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership 
in the United Nations (Article 4 of Charter), 1948 I.C.J. 57, the present Court gave an ex-
tensive interpretation of its jurisdictional powers, holding: "[T]he Court may give an ad-
visory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise," id. at 61, and squarely answered 
a question previously undecided by the Permanent Court. See HUDSON, supra note 11, at 
496-97 ("No case has arisen in which the Court has been requested to give an opinion on 
a purely hypothetical question."). By uniformly rejecting "the magic 'solving words' of tradi-
tional jurisprudence," F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 45 (1960), the Court pursued a func-
tional approach to its advisory jurisdiction. Cf. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 9. The Court has 
scrupulously adhered to its true vocation: that it must act as a "responsible magistrature" 
rather than as an "academy of jurists." Cf. HUDSON. supra note 11, at 511. The first advisory 
opinion requested by the Security Council provided an opportunity for the Court to develop 
its functional approach to advisory jurisdiction . In Namibia, the Court squarely rejected 
efforts to draw distinctions between its competence to decide questions of law or fact: 
The reference to this provision to legal questions cannot be interpreted as 
opposing legal to factual issues. Normally, to enable a court to pronounce on legal 
questions, it must also be acquainted and, take into account and, if necessary, make 
findings as to the relevant factual issues. The limitation of the powers of the Court 
contended for by the Government of South Africa has no basis in the Charter or 
the Statute. 
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 27. In short, the Court's frank recognition that its "objective is to 
ensure that decisions taken are correct: that all elements of fact and law have been brought 
to the notice of the Court, and that the judges are fully aware of them." Lachs, supra note 
37. As I pointed out in another context- "in an international court overly sophisticated rules, 
overly detailed provisions can create many more problems than solve them, and therefore 
may become an obstacle in the search for justice and the proper adjudication of a case." 
Id. Otherwise, as one of the legal realists colorfully wrote: "Law's present classification of 
human activities compels us to sit in places where life's game is no longer played (because] 
(in] pondering many of our long prized abstractions, we study dead bodies from which the 
life we would know has departed." Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J., 71, 76 
(1928). See also Rumble, The Legal Positivism of John Austin and the Realist Movement in 
American Jurisprudence, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 986 (1981). 
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elude, for example, legal issues confronting the organization, the 
effect of Charter and treaty provisions, and resolution of internal 
disputes arising from organization activities.42 While the Court has 
generally been able to exercise the requisite flexibility in conten-
tious proceedings, it clearly has more freedom to analyze and ad-
dress issues from a broader perspective in its advisory capacity. 
This distinction is illustrated by the limitations imposed on the 
Court if two States seek delimitation of a frontier and each makes 
specific submissions and claims. In this hypothetical setting, the 
Court is bound, to a very large extent, by the issues as framed by 
the parties. In contrast, in rendering an advisory opinion, the Court 
may not only interpret but also reformulate the question, and go 
beyond its literal terms to facilitate the fullest exposition of its 
reasoning and the appropriate development of the relevant legal 
issues. The substantial impact of the Court's advisory jurisdiction 
is reflected by the enduring impact of its jurisprudence. 
An illustration of the impact of the Court's advisory jurisdic-
tion arose from the issue of reparation for injuries suffered in the 
service of the United Nations. Great urgency surrounded the resolu-
tion of arrangements to insure agents of the United Nations the 
fullest measure of protection following the Bernadotte 
assassination.43 Although the principle raised little doubt,44 the legal 
capacity of the United Nations to make a claim for reparation was 
unclear, and, as a result, the General Assembly requested the 
Court's opinion on the question.45 The Court addressed this issue 
in the 1949 case.46 
41. At present, nineteen international organizations have standing to request an ad-
visory opinion from the Court. See 1981-1982 I.C.J.Y.B. 50-58. 
42. U.N. CHARTER, art. 96, paras. 1 & 2. 
43. Count Bernadotte was assassinated on Sept. 17, 1948. As will be recalled, intense 
debates surrounded efforts to formulate an appropriate course of action that would pro-
vide adequate protection for agents of the United Nations. See Memorandum of the Secretary 
General, U.N. Doc. A/674 (1948). 
44. To make an international claim, there was no underlying question about the 
availability of reparation in cases of violation of the law. This issue was well settled. See 
e.g., Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 21 (Jurisdiction) (Judg-
ment No. 8 of July 26), 1928 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17, at 27 (Merits) (Judgment No. 13 of Sept. 
13) (Reparation is the "corollary of the violation of the obligations resulting from an engage-
ment between States."); Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (Report III), 2 R. Int'l Arb. A. 615, 
641 (1924) (Huber, J.) ("Responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an 
international character involve international responsibility. If the obligation in question is 
not met, responsibility entails the duty to make reparation."). 
45. G.A. Res. 258, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/674 (1948). 
46. Reparation, 1949 I.C.J. 174. 
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The Court chose not to limit its opinion to a bare affirmative 
response to the question. 47 Instead, it went beyond the literal terms 
of the question and comprehensively addressed the underlying legal 
issues.48 In reaching its conclusion that the United Nations was 
legally competent to make an international claim, the Court deter-
mined that the United Nations was a subject of international law 
and capable of assessing international rights and duties.49 This 
represented the culmination of a long development of international 
law. "Throughout its history, the development of international law 
has been influenced by the · requirements of international life and 
the progressive increase in the collective activities of States."50 Rely-
ing on provisions of the Charter, the Court concluded that the 
United Nations "occupies a position in certain respects in detach-
ment from its Members and is under a duty to remind them, if need 
be, of certain obligations."51 The Court recognized that the United 
Nations was organized to exercise and enjoy "functions and rights 
which can only be explained on the basis of its possession of a large 
measure of international personality, and its capacity to operate 
upon the international plane."52 While the Court decisively stated 
that the United Nations was not a "super-State,"53 the United Na-
tions was recognized as an international person. Thus, for the first 
time in history, an institution other than a State was recognized 
as a subject of international law. 
A whole series of political and legal consequences followed from 
this statement.54 Today, it remains among the most important 
47. "To answer this question, which is not settled by the actual terms of the Charter, 
we must consider what characteristics it was intended to give to the organization." Id. at 177. 
48. More on this approach in his later Separate Opinion in Admissibility of Hearings 
of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 1956 I.C.J. 23 (Advisory Opinion 
of June 1). 
49. "It can maintain its rights by bringing an international claim." 1949 I.C.J. 17 4, 179. 
Such claims could be brought for "damage caused to the interests of the Organization itself, 
to its administrative machine, to its property and assets, and to the interests of which it 
is the guardian." Id. at 180. 
50. Reparation, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178. 
51. Id. at 179. Moreover, the Court noted, "fifty states, representing the vast majority 
of the members of the international community, had the power, in conformity with interna-
tional law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and 
not merely personality recognized by them alone .... " Id. at 185. 
52. Id. at 179. 
53. Id. 
54. Of overarching significance, the Court recognized that "[u]nder international law, 
the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly pro-
vided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implications as being essential 
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statements of the Court.55 Its significance is closely related to the 
fact that the Reparations opinion was decided during the formative 
years of the United Nations. In 1949, States were still unsure what 
to the performance of its duties." 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182. In this context, the Court wrote: 
In order that the agent may perform his duties satisfactorily, he must feel 
that this protection is assured to him by the Organization, and that he may count 
on it. To ensure· the independence of the agent, and consequently, the indepen-
dent action of the Organization itself, it is essential that in performing his duties 
he need not have to rely on any other protection than that of the Organization 
(save of course for the more direct and immediate protection due from the State 
in whose territory he may be). In particular, he should not have to rely on the pro-
tection of his own State. 
1949 I.C.J. 174, 183-184. 
55. Hence, my view that Reparation (and Namibia) rank as "landmarks in the develop-
ment of international law." Lachs, supra note 37, at 44. Reparation constitutes a major under-
pinning of the entire corpus juris gentium even extending beyond the "strengthening of in-
ternational organizations, the clarification of the law by which they are guided, and their 
status ... . " Lachs, supra note 37, at 44. Foremost, its frank holding: "[t]he capacity of the 
Organization to exercise a measure of functional protection of its agents arises by necessary 
intendment out of the Charter." Reparation, 1949 I.C.J. 17 4, 184 (emphasis added). Repara-
tion squarely established the Charter as a constitutive document whose interpretation must 
ultimately "be guided by what we know to be [the drafters'] most general objective ... 
to provide a structure within which the future may settle its own problems." Hurst, The 
Process of Constitutional Construction, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 57-58 (E. Cahn 
ed. 1954). Reparation gave effect and authority to Justice Holmes' eloquent exegesis in the 
international context: "[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act 
... we must realize that they have called into life a being, the development of which could 
not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters." Missouri v. Holland, 
252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). "Provisions of the [Charter] ... are organic living institutions . 
. . [whose] significance is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, 
but by considering their origin and the line of their growth." Gompers v. United States, 
233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.) In short, Reparation teaches, as Judge de Castro observed 
in his separate opinion: "The text breaks away from its authors and lives a life of its own." 
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 184. 
Second, its luminous reasoning is especially instructive because "[j]udicial lawmaking 
in any field requires not only the usual rigorous objectivity but the fortitude to abandon 
formula and to construct anew." Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CALIF. 
L. REV. 615 (1961). As befits a court whose jurisprudential impact rests ultimately on the con-
sent of States, individually and collectively in the international community, Reparation, shorn 
of the "protective veil of adjectives such as ... 'reasonable', 'inherent', 'fundamental' .. 
. whose office usually ... disguise(s) what they are doing and impute(s) to it a derivation 
far more impressive," L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1962), properly "depend[ed] upon its 
societal effects rather than upon the language and the theory employed in support of its 
promulgation" for its acceptance. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 N.Y.U.L.R. (1979) at 739. 
Third, beyond merely illustrating the Court's courage in breaking new ground when 
faced with a novel situation, see, e.g., c. VISSCHER, THE THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 179 (1957), Reparation's decisive rejection of nationality as pertinent to the 
admissibility of an international claim was truly momentous. For even in those instances when 
the agent was a national of the defendant State, by refusing to condition state responsi-
bility on the coincidence of nationality, Reparation insured the availability of a remedy to 
any agent (or successor in interest). See D. VISSCHER supra, at 17 4, 184. 
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standing the United Nations would have and what relationships 
would exist between the organization and its members. Thus the 
principles laid down in the opinion have unquestionably both in-
fluenced the development of other international organizations that 
have emerged as a result of "the progressive increase in the col-
lective activities of States," and limited a State's unrestricted 
freedom of action to further international cooperation. The opinion, 
arguably, made little impression on the general public. Nevertheless, 
it was a milestone in the extraordinary development of international 
law that was underway, nearly unnoticed, in the midst of the gloom 
and confusion of the post-war years. For the first time, an institu-
tion created by States acquired independence and became almost 
an equal: a subject of international law, it could enter into relation-
ships with States and concomitantly conclude binding "agreements" 
with them. 56 
The Court continued to develop the law in various fields. A 
further important step was taken in its opinion on Reservations 
to the Genocide Convention.57 It was an important contribution to 
the development of the Law of Treaties.58 Previously, the use of 
reservations was characterized by differing practices, disputes, and 
controversies.59 The Reservations opinion clarified this situation by 
recognizing reservations as valid, subject to compatibility with the 
56. Reparation, 1949 l.C.J. 174, 188. 
57. 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277. 
58. "The International Court's Advisory Opinion ... clearly merits attention ... because 
it represents the historical moment at which the rhetoric and reasoning of all discussion 
of reservations fundamentally changed." Comment, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: 
How International Legal Doctrine Reflects World Vision, 23 HARV. INT'L L. J. 71, 84-85 (1982). 
59. Prior to the creation of the League of Nations, it was established that a reserva-
tion to a multilateral convention had to be accepted by all the signatory states for the re-
serving state to be considered a party to the treaty. Ruda, Reservations to Treaties, 146 
RECUEIL DES CouRs 95, 112 (1975). In 1931, the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a 
resolution which declared that "a reservation can only be made at the moment of ratifica-
tion if all the other signatory States agree or if such a reservation has been provided for 
in the text of the Convention." LEAGUE OF NATIONS 0.J. Spec. Suppl. 93, at 139 (1931). The pre-
League practice set no substantive limits on reservations and thus contained no permissibility 
criterion. Under the League system the reserving State had to demonstrate that its reser-
vation was covered by the terms of the convention's provision on reservations. A third system 
of rules concerning the juridical effects of reservations was provisionally accepted in 1932 
in 1932 by the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union. It favored the principle 
safeguarding state sovereignty over integrity of a treaty. By taking a liberal view on reser-
vations, each State, whether making a reservation, consenting, or objecting to it, retained 
freedom of action. The relationship between parties to multilateral conventions relied on 
their attitude to a reservation, recorded by one of them. 
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object and purposes of the treaty.60 This principle has become part 
of the general law of treaties.61 
Other issues considered by the Court in its advisory capacity 
are now of historical significance. The functioning of the trusteeship 
system and termination of the mandate system have been addressed 
in some opinions.62 
The advisory opinion on Namibia in 1971, the first such opin-
ion given at the request of the Security Council,63 depicts the 
parameters of the Court's work in developing and clarifying the 
law on the liquidation of the colonial system.64 Before directly reply-
ing to the questions posed by the Security Council concerning the 
legality of South Africa's presence in Namibia after the termina-
tion of the mandate, the Court addressed itself to eleven questions 
formulated in its analysis.65 In so doing, the Court considerably ex-
panded the area of inquiry.66 
First, the Court analyzed the effect of an abstention, by a per-
60. Reservations, 1951 I.C.J . 15, 22-25. The Court advised that with respect to the 
validity of reservations under the Genocide Convention: 
Id. 
(A] State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been objected 
to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others, can be re-
garded as being a party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with 
the object and purpose of the Convention: otherwise, that State cannot be regard-
ed as being a party to the Convention. 
61. Cf. Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 1969 (which contains detailed pro-
visions on the subject; arts. 19-23) Id. at 29. 
62. Cf inter alia International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128 (Advisory 
Opinion of July 11), 
63. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16. 
64. Although this was the sixth time that the Court dealt with the issues involved 
in the mandate for South West Africa, (by GA Resolution 2372 (XXII), June 12, 1968, the 
territory of South West Africa was renamed "Namibia"), it was the one in which it analyzed 
the key provisions of the law on self-determination, mandates and trusteeships. 
65. The opinion deals with a number of complex and often intertwined issues related 
to the law of the United Nations Charter, the powers and functions of the political organs 
of the United Nations (and of its predecessor, the League of Nations), the nature of the Man-
date, the powers and functions of the Court itself, and general international law. Lissitzyn, 
International Law and the Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 50, 51 
(1972). 
66. Namibia, 1971I.C.J.17. Specifically, the Security Council put the following ques-
tion to the Court: "What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence 
of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?" Id.; 25 
U.N. SCOR (1550th mtg.) at 4 (1970). On the formation of the Mandates system, cf. South 
West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections (Ethiopia v. S. Afr., Liberia v. S. Afr.) 1962 I.C.J. 
319, 592. Note, Limitations of the International Legal Mechanism: Namibia (South West Africa) 
A Case Study, 17 How. L. J. 637 (1972). Under this system, former enemy territories were divid-
ed into three categories to be administered by a sovereign nation as mandatory under the 
League of Nation's supervision. Id. 
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manent member of the Security Council, upon the legal character 
of that body's decision.67 As is well known, decisions of the Security 
Council require the affirmative votes of all five permanent members 
on matters which do not have a procedural character.68 An affir-
mative vote generally corresponds to a "yes" vote, but there have 
been numerous instances when permanent members have 
abstained.69 In fact, twenty-one States have been admitted to the 
United Nations without the concurring votes of all the .Permanent 
members of the Security Council.70 The question, as placed before 
the Court, was particularly delicate because the construction of the 
Charter urged by South Africa implied that these States were im-
properly admitted as members of the organization. The admission 
relied, of course, on the practice actually followed by the perma-
nent members as it developed over the preceding quarter century.71 
67. South Africa had contended that the Security Council resolution requesting the 
Court's opinion was invalid. The claim was based upon the fact that during the voting on 
the resolution two members of the Security Council-the Soviet Union and the United 
Kingdom - abstained. 
68. U .N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. The Charter specifies five nations as being perma-
nent members of the Security Council: [t]he Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the 
United States of America .... " Id. art. 23, para. 1. The Security Council is the only prin-
cipal organ of the United Nations where this system of voting is adopted. At the time the 
Charter was drafted the voting mechanism was justified on the grounds that a special respon-
sibility was assumed by and placed upon the major powers for the maintenance of interna-
tional order. Cf. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 216 
(1969). 
69. The Charter explicitly provides for abstention only in the case of Security Coun-
cil decisions under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and article 52(3), when a party 
to the dispute must abstain from voting. U .N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. Neither the Charter 
nor the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure contain any explicit provisions defining 
the effect to be given to an abstention. Nonetheless, permanent members have often volun-
tarily abstained from voting and have been willing that this abstention should not be inter-
preted as a lack of concurrence. This has resulted in a relaxation of the rule requiring un-
animity of the permanent members on nonprocedural questions. For a list of cases in which 
permanent members have voluntarily abstained, see REPERTOIRE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
170-73, (Supp. l, 67-68; Supp. 2, 64; Supp. 3, 95-96); see also Stavropoulos, The Practice of 
Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members of the Security Council under Article 27, 
paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 44 (1967); see generally, 
Liang, Abstention and Absence of a Permanent Member in Relation to the Voting Procedure 
in the Security Council, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 694-708 (1950). 
70. See 2 U.N. Repertory 97-103; id., Supp. 1, Vol. I, 276; id., Supp. 2, Vol. II, 314. 
Illustrative of this trend is the abstention of the United Kingdom in the Security Council 
vote concerning the admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations. 17 U.N. SCOR 
(414th mtg.) at 8-15. 
71. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 22. 
The proceedings of the Security Council extending over a long period supply 
abundant evidence that presidential rulings and the positions taken by members 
of the Council, in particular its permanent members, have consistently and uniformly 
18
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Nevertheless, until the practice was legally sanctioned by the Court 
in Namibia and an abstention was interpreted as an affirmative 
vote, the possibility theoretically existed that a previously abstain-
ing permanent member could have embarked on a new practice: 
claiming that abstention would be tantamount to a negative vote.72 
Second, the Court addressed itself to one of the most controver-
sial questions in contemporary international law: the significance 
of some General Assembly resolutions.73 It found that a resolution 
terminating the mandate was not ultra vires, was legally effective, 
and thus more than a recommendation. 
Further, the Court evaluated the legal effect of Security Coun-
cil resolutions enacted pursuant to articles 24 and 25 of the Charter. 
The distinction between them is one of important legal interest and 
called for what was then a new approach to the interpretation of 
the powers of the Security Council under article 25.74 This paved 
interpreted the practice of voluntary abstention by a permanent member as not 
constituting a bar to the adoption of resolutions ... This procedure followed by 
the Security Council, which has continued unchanged after the amendment in 1965 
of Article 27 of the Charter, has been generally accepted by Members of the United 
Nations and evidences a general practice of that Organization. 
Id. The majority of the Court viewed this practice as a valid interpretation of the Charter 
and as evidence of a new customary rule of law "modifying" the Charter. Id. at 117, 185-87. 
The Court's refusal to distinguish sharply between "interpretation" and "custom" is cor-
rect for it has been suggested that "subsequent practice" in reality "covers two concepts, 
first treaty interpretation by the parties, and second, developing custom." Higgins, The 
Development of International Law by the Political Organs of the United Nations, PROC. AM. 
Soc·y INT'L L. 119 (1965). See generally Dugard, Namibia (South West Africa): The Court's Opin-
ion, South Africa's Response, and Prospects for the Future, 11 Co LUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 32-33 
(1972). 
72. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 22. "By abstaining, a member does not signify its objection 
to the approval of what is being proposed; in order to prevent the adoption of a resolution 
requiring unanimity of the permanent members, a permanent member has only to cast a 
negative vote." Id. 
73. Id. at 45-50: This issue was the result of objections advanced by the governments 
of France and South Africa alleging that the General Assembly acted ultra vires in adop-
ting Resolution 2145 (XXI). Id. at 45. Paragraph 3 of the operative part of that resolution 
declared "that South Africa has failed to fulfill its obligations in respect of the administra-
tion of the Mandated Territory and to ensure that moral and material well-being and security 
of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa and has, in fact, disavowed the Man-
date." As a consequence of this the General Assembly stated that "the Mandate conferred 
upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the government of the Union 
of South Africa is therefore terminated .... " Id. at 46. The Court dealt with the resolution 
by finding that "the United Nations as a successor to the League, acting through its com-
petent organs, must be seen above all as the supervisory institution, competent to pronounce, 
in that capacity, on the conduct of the mandatory with respect to its international obliga-
tions, and competent to act accordingly." Id. at 49-50. 
74. Id. at 51-53. The Court found that Resolution 276, in which the Security Council 
declared that "the continued presence of the South African authorities is illegal" and called 
upon all States "to refrain from any dealings with the government of South Africa," was 
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the way for one of the central issues: the definition of the legal im-
plications for other states resulting from the continuing presence 
of South Africa in Namibia. 75 
But before reaching its conclusions the Court dealt with other 
legal issues. The issue of treaty interpretation posed one of the most 
interesting questions in the case and resulted in the Court's signifi-
cant development of the law. It may be recalled that, following 
World War I, the Allied and Associated Powers collectively assumed 
governance of former colonies of the enemy powers, which, as the 
Covenant stated, were "not yet able to stand by themselves under 
the strenuous conditions of the modern world."76 At the same time, 
they expressly recognized that their obligation for the "well-being 
and development of such peoples form[ed] a sacred trust of 
legally binding upon States. The legal basis of the Resolution was article 24(1) of the Charter, 
which confers implied "general powers" upon the Security Council to discharge its primary 
responsibilities which are limited only by the fundamental principles and purposes of the 
Charter. The_ Court reasoned that the Security Council wa exercising its primary respon-
sibility, the maintenance of international peace and security, when it adopted Resolution 
276. But, finding that the resolution was binding, the Court stressed also the importance 
of article 25: 
Article 25 is not confined to decisions in regard to enforcement action but ap-
plies to 'the decisions of the Security Council' adopted in accordance with the 
Charter. Moreover, that Article is placed, not in Chapter VII, but immediately after 
Article 24 in that part of the Charter which deals with the functions and powers 
of the Security Council. If Article 25 had reference solely to decisions of the Security 
Council concerning enforcement action under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, 
that is to say, if it were only such decisions which had binding effect, then Article 
25 would be superfluous, since this effect is secured by Articles 48 and 49 of the 
Charter. 
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 53. Furthermore: 
It would be an untenable interpretation to maintain that, once ... a declara-
tion had been made by the Security Council under Article 24 of the Charter, on 
behalf of all member States, those Members would be free to act in disregard of 
such illegality or even to recognize violations of law resulting from it. Id. at 52. 
75. Id. at 54-56. "By maintaining the present illegal situation, and occupying the Ter-
ritory without title, South Africa incurs international responsibilities arising from a conti-
nuing violation of an international obligation. It also remains accountable for any violations 
of its international obligations, or of the rights of the people of Namibia." Id. at 54. Having 
found South Africa responsible for creating and maintaining an illegal situation in Namibia, 
the Court found it "under obligation to withdraw its administration from the Territory of 
Namibia." Id. Additionally, member States of the United Nations are obliged to recognize 
the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and to refrain from acts which might 
imply recognition of the legality of South Africa's presence. Nonmember States are required, 
but not legally obliged, to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence. Id. at 54-56. 
76. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para.1. "[T]hose colonies and territories which 
as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States." 
Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 28; see LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1. 
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civilization. ."77 Interpretation of this obligation was squarely 
at issue in the Namibia case, as well as the decision that this respon-
sibility would best be carried out by individual States acting as Man-
datory Powers on behalf of the League.78 Specific issues arose from 
the distinction made between various mandates, Namibia having 
been a so-called C Mandate; due to its sparse population, remoteness 
from civilization, and proximity to the Mandatory Power. The Cov-
enant's drafters sanctioned the virtual assimilation of Namibia's ad-
ministration by the administration of South Africa as the most ap-
propriate means for South Africa to satisfy its obligations under 
the mandate.79 
In Namibia, South Africa contended that the "sacred trust of 
civilization" was merely a kind Of "legal fiction" and argued, instead, 
that the administrative provisions of article 22 amounted to what 
77. Namibia, 1971 l.C.J. 28; LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1. In review-
ing the establishment of the mandate system the Court deemed two principles to be of para-
mount importance- "the principle of non-annexation and the well-being and development 
of such peoples forms 'a sacred trust of civilization."' Namibia, .19711.C.J. 28-29. The Court 
further found that it was "self-evident that the 'trust' had to be exercised for the benefit 
of the peoples concerned, who were admitted to have interests of their own and to possess 
a potentiality for independent existence on the attainment of a certain stage of develop-
ment .... " It stressed the concept of "the sacred trust of civilization" and in determining 
its present scope and meaning adopted a dynamic view of international law. Lissitzyn, supra 
note 65, at 57; see generally Alexandrowicz, The Juridical Expression of the Sacred Trust 
of Civilization, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 149-59 (1971). 
78. Namibia, 19711.C.J. 28. The Court's interpretation of this obligation required an 
examination of the scope and substance of article 22 of the League Covenant. According 
to the League Covenant: 
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle (of a sacred trust) 
is that tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by 
reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best 
undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage 
should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 2, cited in Namibia, 19711.C.J. 29. 
79. The League Covenant states that "[t]he character of the mandate must differ ac-
cording to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the 
territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances." LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
COVENANT art. 22, para. 3. Paragraphs 4 through 6 in Article 22 of the Covenant set forth and 
drew distinctions between three separate entities classified as "A", "B'', and "C" mandates. 
The "C" mandate referred to territories such as South West Africa: 
There are territories, such as South-West Africa ... which, owing to the 
sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the 
centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Man-
datory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the 
Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above 
mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 6. 
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may have been almost an annexation, foreclosing any possibility 
of Namibia's eventual independence.80 This thesis relied on the claim 
that, despite the textual unity of article 22, the drafters of the Cove-
nant viewed the C mandates as different from the other mandates 
and tacitly acquiesced in South Africa's annexation plans. This argu-
ment was based, in part, on the memoirs and records of some of 
the statesmen who participated in drafting the Covenant.81 On the 
whole, however, the extant materials reflect sharply differing 
perceptions of the events at Versailles and were contradicted by 
the clear meaning of treaty provisions.82 
Even if South Africa's account of the events of 1919 and 1920 
were correct and the "sacred trust" of article 22 was a "misleading" 
concept, excluding Namibia from its terms, the question remained 
before the Court: could an interpretation sanctioning complete con-
trol (i.e. de facto annexation), having its origins in events of 1920, 
be maintained in 1970? This question, of course, squarely raised the 
critical issue of intertemporal law, and the Court decided to face 
it, and by so doing, made an important contribution to the develop-
ment of law. The problem had been previously addressed by Judge 
Max Huber in the Island of Palmas arbitration.83 In Namibia the 
court wrote: 
That is why, viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must 
take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the 
80. Namibia, 1971 l.C.J. 28. South Africa appears to have espoused the view that C 
mandates were "in their practical effect not far removed from annexation." Id. 
81. General Smuts of South Africa, the originator of the mandate system, stated in 
1920 that, in his view, the C Class Mandates constituted a situation almost equivalent to 
annexation. He further declared in a 1937 speech: 
When I was Prime Minister, we assured our position as far as South West 
Africa (Namibia) was concerned. I made an argument with Germany and did not 
leave the matter on a basis of force and victory. There is a formal agreement 
whereby Germany acknowledges that the future of South West Africa is with the 
Union (of South Africa), and whereby Germany undertakes to advise her subjects 
in South West Africa to become Union subjects. Our claim to South West Africa 
is therefore based not merely on force or victory, but on an agreement with 
Germany. 
COCKRAM, SOUTH WEST AFRICA MANDATE 81-82, 101 (1976). Conversely, however, other Man-
datory nations approached the annexation controversy with an entirely different viewpoint. 
The Australian administration, for example, specifically declared it would not countenance 
the notion of annexation of C Class Mandates. Id. at 81-82. 
82. They may have been viewed as "inconclusive." Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 72 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (Warren, C.J.) (relating to the Board's 
arguments concerning the drafting of the 14th Amendment). 
83. Island of Palmas, (U.S. V. Neth.) Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
Cf R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (1963). 
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supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain 
unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the 
Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. 
Moreover, an international instrument has to be interpreted and 
applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevail-
ing at the time of interpretation.84 
261 
Obviously, a treaty concluded in another era, if it has to be 
interpreted today, cannot be applied as it might have been on the 
date of its making.85 Thus the Court recognized that law is dynamic, 
that '"the strenuous conditions of the modern world' and 'the well-
being and development' of the peoples concerned-were not static, 
but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the con-
cept of the 'sacred trust."'86 Hence the Covenant of the League of 
Nations must be applied in the spirit of the law, as we live it today.87 
The Court rejected the claim that law can stand still and stressed 
the close relationship between law and life. (While Lord Mansfield 
had freed James Sommerset in Sommerset v. Stewart because the 
positive law of England no longer permitted the institution of 
slavery, he had conceded the authority of contrary law in the 
colonies.)88 In the Namibia opinion the Court went further and 
recognized that even the authority of positive law could not be 
separated from life. Articulation of this principle was a singular 
contribution to the corpus juris gentium. In addition to concluding 
that South Africa was in Namibia illegally, the Court held that this 
illegality was erga omnes.89 Having determined that Namibia was 
entitled to independence, the Court concluded that all States, in-
cluding those not members of the United Nations, were obligated 
84. Namibia, 1971 l.C.J. 31. 
85. This approach to treaty interpretation has subsequently been referred to as the 
"revolutionary method." As it was said: "Special rules of interpretation apply designed to 
adapt the letter of the treaty to circumstances of the time and contemporary expectations." 
Cf COCKRAM, SOUTH WEST AFRICAN MANDATE at 410-11 citing, The Opinion on South West 
Africa (Namibia): The Teleologists' Triumph, 88 S. AFRICAN L.J. 463 (1971). 
86. For example, the Charter of the United Nations confirmed and expanded the prin-
ciple of the sacred trust to include all territories whose peoples have not yet attained a 
full measure of self-government. Cf the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples (G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (1960), that embraced all peoples and 
territories which have not yet attained independence. Namibia, 1971 l.C.J. 31. 
87. Namibia, 1971 l.C.J. 31-32. 
88. "Slavery," held Lord Mansfield, "is of such a nature that it is incapable of being 
introduced into this country, on any reason, moral or political, and can no farther be con-
sidered in this country than is supported by positive law." Somerset v. Stewart Lofft. 1 (1772). 
89. Namibia, 1971 l.C.J. 32. 
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to refuse recognition of South Africa's continued illegal occupation 
of Namibia due to the overarching principle of illegality erga omnes.00 
I mentioned earlier that in one advisory opinion only, the Court 
dealt with twelve issues before replying to the question put to it. 
Those analyzed may serve as major illustrations not only of one 
opinion, but of the advisory function in general. Thus, advisory opin-
ions allow the Court to further, in a broad fashion, the development 
of international law. 
III. Contentious Cases: Continuing Importance in the Develop-
ment of Law 
I turn now to the Court's contribution in what is its main 
activity: rendering judgments in contentious cases. Here again some 
illustrations may suffice. In 1970, in the Barcelona Traction Case,91 
it formulated a clear distinction between bilateral obligations and 
obligations erga omnes.92 
90. Id. at 56. 
91. Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 
1970 l.C.J. 3 (Second Phase) (Judgment of Feb. 5) [hereinafter cited as Barcelona Traction]. 
The Court's 1970 decision culminated litigation dating back to 1948. Prior "to the filing of 
the Belgian application [before the ICJ in 1958], 2736 orders had been made in the case and 
494 judgments given by lower and 37 by higher courts" in Spain. Id. at 10. Belgium volun-
tarily discontinued the first proceeding in 1961, as it was hoped that the dispute could be 
resolved by negotiations. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 
19611.C.J. 9 (Order of Apr. 10). These efforts, however, failed and Belgium submitted a new 
application on June 19, 1962. The Spanish government subsequently filed four preliminary 
objections, contending (1) Belgium's 1961 discontinuance equalled a dismissal on the merits, 
(2) the ICJ had not succeeded to the compulsory jurisdiction that Spain conferred on the 
Permanent Court by treaty in 1927, (3) Belgium was withoutjus standi to make an interna-
tional claim on behalf of its shareholders, and (4) local remedies were not exhausted. In 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1964 l.C.J. 6 (Preliminary 
Objections) (Judgment of July 24), the Court rejected the first two objections, holding, in-
teralia, that the 1961 discontinuance did not go to the merits and could not constitute an 
estoppel, id. at 17-19, and the 1927 Hispano-Belgian Treaty of Conciliation, Judicial Settle-
ment and Arbitration, established a "basic obligation to submit to compulsory adjudication 
... not necessary making the Permanent Court the only possible" forum. Id. at 37-38. The 
Court declined to rule on the third and fourth objections and joined them to the merits. 
Id. at 46. Nearly six years intervened, however, before the litig~tion ended. As previously 
noted, this prolonged delay sparked procedural reforms in the Court. See also Lachs, The 
Revised Procedure of the International Court of Justice, in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 21 (1980). 
92. The Court significantly developed the concept of erga omnes duties and obliga, 
tions by clarifying and clearly identifying its broad applicability and relevance in modern 
international law in Barcelona Traction. See Lachs, supra note 7, at 1971. One of the earliest 
illustrations of acts affecting the international community as a whole was piracy which has 
been uniformly recognized in international law as a universal crime. See, e.g., United States 
v. Furlong (The Pirates), 18 U.S. 86, 97, 5 Wheat. 184, 197 (1820) ("Robbery on the seas is 
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Suffice it to say, the case involved the Barcelona Traction, 
Light, and Power Company, Ltd., a company that was incorporated 
in Toronto in 1911 as a holding company for various Canadian and 
Spanish subsidiaries.93 The company was declared bankrupt subse-
. . . within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. It is against all, and punished by all. 
.. . ")In re Piracy jure gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.); cf. Beak v. Thyrwhit, 3 Mod. 194, 87 
Eng. Rep. 124 (K.B. 1689); Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (Judgment of 
Sept. 7); see generally 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 71 ("The offence of piracy, by com-
mon law, consists in committing those acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas 
which, if committed upon land, would have amounted to felony there."); 2 HAWKINS, PLEASE 
OF THE CROWN 515, 517, 522 (8th ed.1824); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 189-94 (2d ed.1936); 
Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 335 (1925) ("As it is an in-
ternational crime it is within the jurisdiction of all maritime states wheresoever or by whom-
soever committed."); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LA w 602-04 (3d ed. 1982). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 34 (1965). 
Subsequently, the right of any State to punish trafficking in slaves was also recognized, 
albeit with varying degrees of unanimity during the 19th century. See, e.g., Lemmon v. People, 
20 N.Y. 562 (1860). In Lemmon, which one commentator appropriately characterized as "the 
uttermost expansion of the libertarian implications of Sommerset," D. FEHRENBACHER. THE 
DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LA w AND POLITICS 61 (1978), see 2 w ARREN. 
supra note 30, at 360-61. The N.Y. Court of Appeals affirmed issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus to liberate eight slaves whose presence in the state was, at most, only momentary. 
Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 599-600, 630-31. While holding that the writ properly issued under the 
authority of local law, the Court made passing reference to the relevant application of in-
ternational law and noted: 
[Slavery is] a status which the law of nations treats as resting on force against 
right, and finding no support outside the municipal law which establishes it. (cita-
tions omitted) Why should not the State be able to utterly suppress it within her 
jurisdiction? She is not required by the rule of the law of nations ... to uphold 
it. Men are not the subject of property by such law, nor by any law, ... The public 
law exacts no obligation from this State to enforce the municipal law which makes 
men the subject of property; but by that law the strangers stand upon our soil 
in their natural condition as men. 
Id. at 631. In Creole, the Chief Justice of the Bahama Islands held that the blacks who had 
mutinied and brought the ship, bound from Virginia to New Orleans, into Nassau, could 
not be tried as pirates. See Protest of Zephaniah C. Gifford, 61 NILES' NAT'L REG. 323 (1842); 
McCargo v. New Orleans Insurance Co., 10 Rob. 202 (La. 1845) (slavetraders not entitled 
to indemnification); D. WEBSTER, DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER WHILE 
SECRETARY OF STATE 83-94 (1848). See also Jones, The Influences of Slavery on the Webster-
Ashburton Negotiations, 22 J.S. HIST. 48 (1956); Jones, The Peculiar Institution and National 
Honor: The Case of the Creole Slave Revolt, 21 C1v. WAR HIST. 28 (1975). From even this cur-
sory analysis, the conclusion may be drawn that erga omnes may be viewed as the witness 
and external deposit of our moral life. 
93. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 7. For a detailed exposition of the factual events 
underlying the litigation in Barcelona Traction, see Kearney, Sources of Law and the Inter-
national Court of Justice, in 2 FUTURE OF COURT, supra note 10, at 665-81. The Court's deci-
sion in Barcelona Traction has engendered considerable commentary, (both positive and 
negative). See, e.g., Higgins, Aspects of the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Company, Ltd., 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 327 (1971); Tammes, Means of Redress in the 
General International Law of Peace, in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDER. 1, 13-14 (1980); Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Social Function of Property and Prop-
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quent to a proceeding commenced by company bondholders. Belgium 
appeared before the Court to claim reparation for the injuries suf-
fered by its nationals,94 while Canada, the place of incorporation, 
refused to appear.95 The central issue before the Court was 
jurisdictional- the competence of Belgium to extend protection to 
Belgian shareholders when the company was a juridical entity in-
corporated in Canada.96 Thus, the case involved diplomatic protec-
tion and bilateral relationships.97 On this point, the Court determined 
erty Protection inPresent-da,y International Law, in id. at 77, 84-87; Briggs, The Jus Standi 
of Belgium, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 327 (1971). 
94. Belgian nationals owned approximately 88 percent of the company's capital in 1962. 
See generally Kearney, Sources of Law and the International Court of Justice, in 2 FUTURE 
OF COURT. supra note 10, at 665-66. 
95. The Canadian government ceased diplomatic efforts to foster a negotiated settle-
ment after 1955 and subsequently declined to appear in the proceedings before the Court. 
The Court, however, held that "the right of protection vested in the national State of the 
company cannot be regarded as extinguished because it is not exercised .... " Barcelona 
Traction, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 49. To deny the force of this conclusion would undermine the security 
of international agreements. Id. 
96. On this point, the Court directly addressed the argument that there was a denial 
of justice: 
The Court fully appreciates the importance of the legal problems raised by 
the allegation, which is at the bottom of the Belgian claim for reparation, concern-
ing the denials of justice allegedly committed by organs of the Spanish State. 
However, the possession by the Belgian Government of a right of protection is 
a prerequisite for the examination of these problems. Since no jus standi before 
the Court has been established, it is not for the Court in its Judgment to pronounce 
upon any other aspect of the case, on which it should take a decision only if the 
Belgian Government had a right of protection in respect of its nationals, 
shareholders in Barcelona Traction. 
1970 I.C.J. 4, 51. 
97. This led to the distinction made (and referred to above) between "the obligations 
of a State towards the internationals community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another 
State in the field of diplomatic protection." 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32. Noting that "no legal impedi-
ment prevent[s] the Canadian Government from protecting Barcelona Traction," id. at 44, 
and "since Spain is not the national State of Barcelona Traction," id. at 48, no equitable 
considerations required departure from the prevailing rule, the Court recognized that the 
relationship of the shareholder to the company "remain[s] limited, this being, moreover, a 
corollary of the limited nature of their liability." Id. at 35. Although the corporation is one 
of the "municipal institutions, which have transcended frontiers and have begun to exer-
cise considerable influence on international relations," id. at 33, this hardly changes the reality 
of its own structure and the conclusion that necessarily followed: "Not a mere interest 
affected, but solely a right infringed involves responsibility ... . "Id. at 36. In this context, 
the Court's conclusion seems particular.ly cogent, if related to the realities of international life. 
If the Court were to decide the case in disregard of the relevant institutions 
of municipal law it would, without justification, invite serious legal difficulties. It 
would lose touch with reality, for there are no corresponding institutions of inter-
national law to which the Court could resort. Thus the Court has, as indicated, 
not only to take cognizance of municipal law but also to refer to it ... In referring 
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that Belgium had no jus standi.98 The Court, however, formulated 
a principle of major importance: 
When a State admits into its territory foreign investments 
or foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound 
to extend them the protection of the law and assumes obligations 
concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, 
however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an 
essential distinction should be drawn between obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole and those aris-
ing vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection.99 
Thus it identified two distinct types of obligations: obligations owed 
to the international community, as a whole, and those owed solely 
to individual states. This distinction, though not technically part 
of the Court's ratio decidendi, was drawn to emphasize the distinc-
tion and had some influence on the law.100 
to such [municipal] rules, the Court cannot modify, still less deform them. 
Id. at 37. Although, in many instances, foreign investments are protected by various treaties 
and special agreements (see, e.g., Juillard, Les Conventions Bilaterales d'Investissement Con-
clues par la France, 2 JOURNAL DU.DROIT INTERNATIONAL 274 (1979) (extensive discussion of 
French practice); Gantz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of Negotiation and Compensa-
tion for Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 474 (1977); Rossi-Guerrero, The Transition 
from Private to Public Control in the Venezuelan Petroleum Industry, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 475 (1976); Muller, Compensation for Nationaliza.tion: A North-South Dialogue, 19 CoLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35 (1981)), the Court found that "no such instrument is in force between the 
Parties to the present case." 1970 l.C.J. 3, 47. Moreover, "on the universal level, the in-
struments which embody human rights do not confer on States the capacity to protect the 
victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of their nationality." Id. 
98. "[T]he possession by the Belgian Government of a right of protection is a prere-
quisite for the examination of these problems .... " 1970 l.C.J. 3, 51. In the absence of a 
"rule of international law which expressly confers such a right on the shareholders' national 
State," id. at 37, "no jus standi before the Court has been established .... " Id. at 51. 
99. 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32. 
100. Cf. the general comments on the Court's decision in South West Africa (Ethiopia 
v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1966 l.C.J. 6 (Second Phase) (Judgment of July 18), Memorial 
of South Africa (Advisory Opinion of June 21), 19711.C.J. Pleadings (1Namibia)427-37, 451-73. 
A distinction between holding and dicta should be borne in mind to avoid the perils lurking 
behind the fallacies a decision-making that Oliphant aptly termed the "org[ies] of over 
generalization" and "stare decisis." Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 74 (1928). 
Yet "the orthodox wild goose chase ... after a formula which will determine the 'real' ratio 
decidendi of a case," Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 844 n.82, is often unnecessary, as it may frustrate the court's affirmative duty 
to develop international law. Cf. H. LAUTERPACHT. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LA w 
23-24 (1934) ("[i]t is impossible to apply to the work of the Court the supposedly rigid delimita-
tion between obiter dicta and the ratio decidendi applicable to a legal system based on the 
strict doctrine of precedent." Moreover, the willingness of the Court to go beyond the limits 
of formal logic in Barcelona Traction and explicitly identify the two distinct international 
obligations has contributed immeasurably to a more comprehensive protection of basic human 
rights, particularly in the international context. 
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The Court also stated in this context: 
By their very nature, the former obligations concerning the 
community as a whole are the concern of all States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have 
a legal interest in their protection; there are obligations erga omnes. 
Such obligations derive, for example in contemporary international 
law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression and genocide, as also 
from the principles and rules concerning basic rights of the human 
person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. 
All these constitute obligations erga omnes.101 
The enumeration of these rights also has an interesting history. 
Although the International Law Commission introduced the notion 
of jus cogens as a major component in the 1966 draft of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties, the Convention ultimately 
adopted in 1969 did not include any specific examples of peremp-
tory rules of international law.102 One may suggest that such ex-
amples may be deduced from the Barcelona Traction103 and 
Namibia104 cases. Moreover, the reliance of the International Law 
Commission on this formulation in its subsequent work on state 
responsibility is a clear demonstration of the Court's contribution 
to the development of the law.105 Thus recognition of certain rights 
and obligations erga omnes, whether jus cogens or not, forms a firm 
foundation for the effective development of the law corresponding 
to the needs of the international community. 
Another interesting development may be found in 197 4, when 
the Court considered the validity of unilateral declarations in the 
101. 1970 l.C.J. 3, 32. M. LACHS, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 197. This clear ar-
ticulation of a duty to protect basic rights has been particularly helpful providing focus for 
the evolving notion of jus cogens and the work of the International Law Commission on state 
responsibility. 
102. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, May 23, 1969, art. 58, U.N. Doc. 
A/CO NF. 39/27 (1969). 
103. Cf. cited above acts of aggression, genocide, 1970 l.C.J. 4, 185. 
104. Such as apartheid, Namibia, 19711.C.J. 56; "To establish ... and to enforce distinc-
tions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations, exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, 
descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights 
is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter." Id. at 57. 
105. See, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-second 
Session (1980), Doc. A/CN.4, Draft article on State Responsibility where it was observed 
that: "Such legal relationships [among nations] would depend on the source of the interna-
tional obligation breached, which could be a bilateral or multilateral agreement, a special 
multilateral agreement establishing an international regime, a rule of jus cogens or a rule 
of customary international law." Id. at 4. 
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Nuclear Test Cases. 106 While this case was before the Court, the 
President of France made a public statement indicating that the 
nuclear tests to be conducted during the summer of 1974 were to 
be the last atmospheric tests contemplated by the French 
government.101 Because Australia and New Zealand contended that 
previous French statements were inadequate and sought a finding 
that France was legally obligated to cease further testing,1°8 the 
Court sought to determine whether the President's statement af-
fected the resolution of the case.109 
The Court relied on the French President's declaration in its 
decision.110 Of course, care is necessary when assessing unilateral 
statements in general because they may not imply binding 
obligations.m Political officials may indicate their readiness to per-
form certain acts in ostensibly inadvertent remarks. In those cir-
cumstances, the State seeking to give the statement binding effect 
must show that the statement was made with a binding intent.112 
One must consider both the status of the speaker, whether it is 
a secretary of an embassy, an official of the ministry of foreign af-
fairs, or the head of State,113 and the circumstances in which the 
statement is made. 
There are well-known precedents in which unilateral 
106. The Australian government instituted an action in the International Court of Justice 
against the government of France seeking an order from the Court that atmospheric testing 
of nuclear devices by France was contrary to international law. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. 
v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Judgment of Dec. 20). 
107. Id. at 256. 
108. Id. at 265. 
109. Id. at 266. 
110. The Court observed that France, in announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric 
tests would be the last, had conveyed its intentions to the world. Consequently, other States 
were apt to rely on this announcement. The Court noted that: "[t]he validity of these 
statements and their legal consequences must be considered within the general framework 
of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential 
in the rela~ions among States." The Court concluded that because the objects of the 
statements made by the French President were clear and addressed to the international 
community, they had legal effect. Id. at 269. 
111. A unilateral statement becomes a binding obligation if the maker of the statement 
is a person capable of binding his government and intends the statement to be binding. See, 
e.g., VON GLAHN, AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC IN.TERNATIONAL LAW 503-04 (1981) (for an explana-
tion of the binding effect of an unilateral statement). 
112. Id. 
113. The validity of an international agreement, or, ar. in this case, of a binding unilateral 
statement, depends also on the authority of the party making the statement. Normally, 
statements made by, or treaties negotiated through, unauthorized agents cannot be con-
sidered binding, in the absence of detrimental reliance. Id. at 499. 
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statements of Foreign Ministers were held binding. In the Eastern 
Greenland case, the Permanent Court of International Justice con-
sidered the famous "Ihlen Declaration" made by the Foreign 
Minister of Norway.114 The Minister had conceded to the Am-
bassador of Denmark that Norway made no claims on Eastern 
Greenland. The Permanent Court concluded that this statement was 
binding. It relied on the functions of a foreign minister, and, since 
a foreign minister is presumed to be aware of a statement's im-
pact, the State he represents must be bound by that statement.115 
In the Nuclear Test Cases, the Court state that "[t]he unilateral 
statements of the French authorities were made outside the Court, 
publicly and erga omnes . ... 116 The Court held that: 
[t]he general nature and characteristics of these statements are 
decisive for the evaluation of the legal implications .... In announ-
cing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, 
the French government conveyed to the world at large, including 
the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests. 
[France] was bound to assume that other States might take note 
of these statements and rely on their being effective.117 
To reach this conclusion, the Court proceeded to a wider analysis 
of changing trends in the conduct of foreign relations: 
The validity of these statements and their legal consequences 
must be evaluated within the general framework of the security 
of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which 
are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual 
substances of these statements, and from the circumstances attend-
ing their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act 
must be deduced.118 
114. On July 22, 1919, M. Ihlen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, stated to 
the Representative of Denmark that Norway would not object to Denmark's plans over 
Eastern Greenland. This declaration was recorded in the minutes of the meeting and was 
certified by the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Denmark took the position that the declara-
tion was a binding agreement by which Norway had acquiesced in the extension of Danish 
sovereignty over East Greenland. Norway maintained that the declaration was not binding, 
but was instead an expression of the attitude that Norway would assume in future negotia-
tions with Denmark. Additionally, Norway argued that the declarations of its foreign minister 
could not have binding effect since it was outside the scope of his constitutional authority. 
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J., serv. A/B, No. 43, at 38 (Judg-
ment of Apr. 5). 
115. Id .• at 71-73. 
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Thus it recognized that public statements of a head of State are 
not made lightly, and as a matter of law, such statements must be 
considered binding. 
This judgment, like many others, was subject to conflicting 
comments. Some argued that the Court's holding went too far and 
bound the French government to a conduct that it had not 
intended.119 The French President's statement, however, was made 
at a press conference; thus it was erga omnes120 and arguably, it was 
unnecessary to address the statement specifically to Australia or 
New Zealand. Moreover, the nuclear tests in the Pacific affected 
other States as well. Relying on these facts, the Court held that 
the statement constituted a binding undertaking of the French 
government and the case, therefore, was moot.121 
It may be claimed that this conclusion contributed to the 
development of yet another area of the Court's jurisprudence. It 
manifestly stressed its role of resolving disputes and not artificially 
prolonging those that have ceased to exist. Such is the Court's role 
once a case has been found moot.122 Simultaneously, the Court resolv-
119. One writer has criticized the Court for attributing binding character to France's 
unilateral declaration on the principle of good faith. See Elkind, Footnote to the Nuclear Test 
Cases: Abuse of Right-A Blind Alley for Environmentalists, 9 V AND. J. TRANS. L. 57 (1976). He 
observed that the Court wa able to dismiss the action brought by the applicant States for 
lack of jurisdiction. He admitted, however, that situations in which the Court has applied 
the principle of good faith to give binding effect to unilateral declarations involve contrac-
tual relations between the contesting parties. (For example, in the Lake Lanoux Affair (Spain 
v. Fr.), 12 U.N.R.l.A.A. 281 (1957), where the French government attempted to establish 
a hydroelectrical power plant along its border with Spain. Water for the power plant was 
to be diverted from the lake, and France had made guarantees to Spain that waters so 
diverted would be restored. The border between the two countries had been settled by the 
Treaty of Bayonne of May 26, 1866.) In the Nuclear Test Case no such contractual relation 
existed. Consequently, it was argued that the use of the principle of good faith was unwar-
ranted and "was used to shield France from an action seeking to bar it from conducting 
atmospheric nuclear tests in the Pacific, an activity which it had been conducting in de-
fiance of an Interim Order of Protection." Elkind, supra, at 61. On the other hand, the Court's 
decision has been likened in importance to the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Franck, World made Law: The Decision 
of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Test Cases, 69 AM. J. INT'L. L. 612 (1975). 
Franck shared the Court's view because as he concludes: "each State must now recognize 
that what it solemnly says it will do, or more important, what it says it will not do becomes 
a part of that trellis of reciprocal expectations on which the fragile international system 
grows." Id. at 616. Cf Lellouche, The Nuclear Test Cases: Judicial Silence v. Atomic Blasts, 
16 HARV. INT'L L. J. 614 (1975), and other comments on the judgment, Stern, L 'affaire des essais 
nucleaires francais devant la Gour internationale de Justice, ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 299 (1974). 
120. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 l.C.J. 253, 269. 
121. Id. at 271. 
122. Id. at 270-71. 
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ed the claims of the parties who invoked the question of its 
jurisdiction. 
Three conclusions may be drawn from the Court's judgment 
in the Nuclear Tests Cases. First, in a world where we move toward 
greater simplification ofinternational relations, where treaties are 
no longer solemn, sealed agreements signed at ceremonies but are 
instead concluded by letters, telegrams, or even orally, the lack of 
formality equally affects the validity of unilateral statements. The 
large quantity of rights acquired, and obligations assumed, en-
courages States to dispense with traditional formalities. Present-
ly, in comparison to the practice of a century or even two decades 
ago, treaties are concluded less formally: approximately three-
quarters of today's treaties are concluded in a simplified manner. 
To deny them the same flexibility accorded other international 
transactions that are frequently concluded by telephone or letter 
would amount to ignoring the needs of international life.123 
This move toward greater simplification also leads to the con-
clusion that a unilateral declaration, such as one involving the sub-
ject of a pending dispute, may be binding. At a press conference, 
reporters asked the French Minister of Defense whether Australia 
and New Zealand were informed of the statements made by the 
French President.124 He replied that because those States were ad-
vised by the press, no direct communication was necessary. From 
this answer, the parties were given the indication that they could 
rely on the press, a circumstance that clearly supports the Court's 
conclusion that the statement was binding. 
This trend toward simplification of international relations 
makes good faith an increasingly important element: their mutual 
interdependence is self-evident, less formality requires more trust. 
The Court recognized this interdependence in the Nuclear Test 
Cases. 
IV. Development of Equitable Principles in International Law 
In contentious cases, the Court, though charged with deciding 
the legal issues and applying the relevant rules of law by the terms 
of article 38 of its Statute, has looked to the equities to render a 
123. See, GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL L AW 450-520 (2d ed. 1976); c. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL L AW 
96-102 (1971 ). Cf Lachs, Developpement et les fonctions des traites multilateraux, 92 COLLECTED 
COURSES, HAGUE A CADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (1957). 
124. Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 270. 
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just judgment.125 Decisions in two cases may be of special interest: 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases126 and the Case Concerning 
the Continental Shelj.121 Although framed in terms of delimiting the 
continental shelf and maritime boundaries, in plain language these 
cases concerned oil. 
In the North Sea Cases, the Court concluded that no conven-
tional rule bound the parties, 128 and as a result it dealt with ques-
tions of customary law.129 In this context it may be appropriate to 
dwell on the Court's place in the definition of its role. This subject 
is of particular interest, but in view of its dimensions I may leave 
it for another occasion and turn to another subject that was ad-
dressed in this and other cases. It is the subject of equity.130 The 
Court made an attempt to define its main function: 
125. The International Curt of Justice, as was pointed out by the late Judge El-Erian, 
displayed, in general, sensitivity to changing ideas and policies governing state behavior 
and responsibility, supra note 25, at 205-10. The practical importance of the Court's role in 
the international arena lies primarily not in the application of international law-for the 
Court is not the sole law applying organ- but rather in the special technique chosen for 
this end. Thus, the mandate of the Court is not limited to its enumerated powers and the 
existing rules of decision, but is extended to the logical consequence of dispute settlement 
by the application of the judicial technique. See, e.g., I.C.J. STATUTE, art. 38, para. 2. ("This 
provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if 
the parties agree thereto.") The task of the Court is "not to apply but to deduce principles 
which it may apply from custom, from general principles of law, and from judicial precedents." 
M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, PAST AND FUTURE 102 (1944). In Serbian Loans (Fr. v. 
Serbia), 1919 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 20 (Judgment of July 12), the Permanent Court held that 
Article 38 (in its amended form) cannot be regarded as excluding the possibility of the Court's 
dealing with disputes which do not require the application of international law. Id. at 20. 
In Right of Passage (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of Apr. 12), the Court held that 
the day-to-day exercise of the right formulated by Portugal with the correlative obligation 
upon India "may give rise to delicate questions of application," but that it is not sufficient 
ground for holding that the "right is not susceptible of judicial determination with reference 
to Article 38(1)". Id. at 37. 
126. Cf. the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. Fed. Rep. v. Den.; Ger. Fed. Rep. 
v. Neth.), 1969 l.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 20), reprinted in 8 l.L.M. 340 (1969). 
127. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamhiriya), 1982 
I.C.J. 18 (Judgment of Feb. 23), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 225 (1982). 
128. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969 I.C.J. 3, 27-28. 
129. In this case, the application of the equidistance principle as customary law was 
involved. The Court observed that in order for a customary rule to develop, it must at some 
stage be possible that States have created a legal obligation between them emanating from 
their sufficiently uniform conduct. "The States concerned must therefore feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation." Id. at 44. Cf. my dissenting opinion on 
the process of shaping customary law, supra note 37, at 225. 
130. The question has frequently been addressed in both theory and practice. "The ma-
jority of international lawyers seem to agree that [law and equity] are to be understood 
to mean general principles of justice as distinguished from any particular system or 
jurisprudence of the municipal law of any state." Norwegian Claims Case (U.S. v. Nor.), Per-
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Equity does not necessarily imply equality. There can never 
be any question of completely refashioning nature, and equity does 
not require that a State without access to the sea should be allotted 
an area of continental shelf, any more than there could be a ques-
tion of rendering the situation of a State with an extensive 
coastline similar to that of a State with a restricted coastline. 
Equality is to be reckoned within the same plane, and it is not such 
natural inequalities as these that equity could remedy .131 
Accepting that the object of equity is not to reverse nature, 
its main purpose remains to temper the inequality created by nature 
and by man. Nature has divided its wealth very unevenly; States 
find themselves, by coincidence, in very different situations that 
create a gap between wealth and poverty .132 
manent Court of Arbitration (Award of Oct. 13, 1922), reprinted in 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 362, 
384 (1922). In this respect equity has developed as part and parcel of the modern interna-
tional system of administration of justice. Indeed, it was observed that: "[E]quity in general 
[is] a yardstick, a way of measuring and interpreting legal rights and obligations ... equity 
... can contribute to the evolution of a new balance of rights and duties in many fields 
of international law." Friedman, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of In-
ternational Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279, 289-90 (1963). Cf. equity applied in important decisions: 
the Cayuga Indian Case (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 1926 Nielsen Rep. 203, 307; the Diversion of 
Waters from the Meuse, (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 70, at 7 (Judgment of 
June 28). Hudson reiterated, on that occasion, the early English maxim that "he who seeks 
equity must do equity." Id. at 76. Cf. also Brierly's observation that equity has developed 
as a "principle which is found to be generally accepted by civilized legal systems [and] may 
fairly be assumed to b~ so reasonable as to be necessary to the maintenance of justice under 
any system." J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF PEACE 63 (H. Waldock ed. 1963). 
131. North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 50-51. 
132. The abyss between the developed and developing world has remained. This has 
not helped to decrease distrust of foreign economic intervention. This is particularly linked 
with issues of sovereignty over natural resources and nationalization. See Note, Creating 
a Framework for the Re-Introduction of International Law to Controversies over Compensa-
tion for Expropriation of Foreign Investments, 9 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 163, 166 (1982). By 
its decisions the International Court of Justice has stressed the role of equity in order, in-
ter alia, to build sound legal relations in worldwide dimensions, particularly between the 
North and the South. 
The United Nations added impetus to the development of a new international economic 
order by three well-known resolutions. In the Declaration on the Establishment of New In-
ternational Economic Order, the General Assembly proclaimed a "united determination to 
work urgently for [an order] based on equity .... " G.A. Res. 3201, 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9556 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. at 715-16. This was followed 
by the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
G.A. Res. 3202, 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9556 (1974), reprinted 
in 13 I.L.M. 720 (1974). Finally, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States declared 
its purpose to promote a new international economic order based, inter alia, on equity. G.A. 
Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 
252. 
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In 1982, the Court had the opportunity to update the concept 
of equity. After eight years, Libya and Tunisia requested the Court 
to determine the controlling principles and rules of international 
law for delimitation of the continental shelf between them. Both 
States specifically referred to trends in international law recognized 
in the Third Conference of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), and 
equitable principles, as relevant factors for the Court to consider 
in its judgment.133 Despite the fact that the Convention was not yet 
in force, it represented the view of the overwhelming majority of 
States and was rather specific concerning the method for the 
delimitation of continental shelf areas,134 particularly regarding the 
relevance of "equitable principles." Moreover, in light of these clear 
indications, the Court was able to develop a much broader defini-
tion of equity: 
Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of 
justice. The Court whose task is by definition to administer justice 
is bound to apply it. In the course of the history of legal systems 
the term "equity" has been used to define various legal concepts. 
It was often contrasted with the rigid rules of positive law, the 
severity of which had to be mitigated in order to do justice. In 
general, this contrast has no parallel in the development of inter-
national law; the legal concept of equity is a general principle 
directly applicable as law. Moreover, when applying positive in-
ternational law, a court may choose among several possible inter-
pretations of the law the one which appears, in the light of the 
circumstances of the case, to be closest to the requirements of 
justice.135 
133. The Special Agreement between Libya and Tunisia submitting this dispute to the 
Court, outlined the following question: "What are the principles and rules of international 
law which may be applied for the delimitation of the area of the continental shelf apper-
taining to the Republic of Tunisia and the area of the continental shelf appertaining to the 
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." 
Special Agreement between the Republic of Tunisia and the Socialist People's Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, signed June 10, 1977, quoted in Continental Shelf, 1982 l.C.J. 18, 21, para. 
2. Neither State was party to Article 83(1) of the Convention of the Law of the Sea adopted 
by UN CLOS III which stipulates: "The delimitation of the continental shelf between States 
with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of interna-
tional law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
in order to achieve an equitable solution". 
Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. 18, 49, para. 50. Since the parties requested that the "trends" 
accepted by UNCLOS III incorporated in the provisions of the Draft Convention of the Law 
of the Sea be considered, the Court agreed to examine these factors when interpreting the 
state of existing law. Id. at 37-38, 47-48. See generally, K. SIMMONDS. U.N. CONVENTION ON THE 
LA w OF THE SEA 1982 passim (1983) (compilation of basic text, dealing with the Law of the Sea). 
134. Continental Shelf, 1982 l.C.J. 18, 60. 
135. Id. 
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To ensure that this general concept did not lead to distortion of 
the judicial function, the Court was careful to indicate that "[w]hile 
it is clear that no rigid rules exist as to the exact weight to be at-
tached to each element in the case, this is very far from being an 
exercise of discretion or conciliation; nor is it an operation of 
distributive justice."136 
This new appreciation of the mutual relationship between law 
and equity, which defines the latter by making it directly applicable 
as law, should be viewed as an important step forward in the 
development of both law and equity.137 This new definition has far-
reaching implications for the future interpretation of the law. It 
assures that, if equity lacks independent existence, it is built into 
international law. In this respect, even a rule of law which does 
not refer to equity must be applied in an equitable manner.138 Other-
wise, the application of positive law may lead to undesirable, un-
just, and even absurd conclusions. Contrary to Anglo-American legal 
tradition, where parties sought law in courts, and to temper the 
rigidities of the common law, sought justice in equity;139 in interna-
tional law, equity is actually built into the law.140 By giving effect 
to equitable principles to ensure fair administration of justice, the 
Court advanced and broadened international jurisdiction. The Court 
136. Id. Cf also the critical comments by the dissenting judges and some comments 
identifying the decision as "verging on an unauthorized determination ex aequo et bona." 
Feldman, The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case: Geographic Justice or Judicial Com-
promise? 77 AM. J. lNT'L L. 219 (1983). 
137. Although in the Continental Shelf case the Court was reluctant to establish a precise 
formula defining the equitable principles that may apply to maritime delimitation, the judg-
ment does provide several significant indications in this context. First, in stating the dif-
ferences between equity as "a general principle directly applicable as law" and a decision 
ex aequo et bona, which would not be based on legal rules, the Court concluded that equitable 
sharing of resources is inapplicable here. Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. 18, 60, 77. Second, 
the Court concluded that delimitation in accordance with equitable principles must be sen-
sitive to the relationship between the coasts of the parties and the maritime areas to be 
delimited. Id. at 75-91. Lastly, equitable delimitation must incorporate relevant factors 
emanating from the behavior of the parties whether by affirmative action or by a prolonged 
acquiescence or absence of protest. Id. at 70. 
138. So it was suggested that the ambiguous nature of equity could be harnessed by 
recognizing that "~ach particular case is to be settled with reference to its own special 
characteristics." Janis, The Ambiguity of Equity in International Law, 9 BROOKLYN J. lNT'L 
L. 7, 33 (1983). 
139. One may recall Grotius: 
In judging of the will by natural reason, Aristotle, who has treated the sub-
ject with great accuracy, makes the mind the seat of judgment and the will the 
seat of equity, which he nobly defines to be the correction of that, wherein the law, 
by reason of its universal nature is defective. And upon this principle all wills and 
treaties ought to be interpreted. 
H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF w AR AND PEACE, 190 (Campbell trans. 1901). 
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brought its jurisdiction into a closer relationship with, and adapted 
to it, the requirements of life. 
V. The Court as a Review Tribunal 
In addition to its contentious and advisory jurisdiction, the 
Court also acts as a review tribunal for the United Nations Ad-
ministrative Tribunal and the Administrative Tribunal of the In-
ternational Labor Organization (ILO). This special procedure is in-
tended to resolve disputes arising between international organiza-
tions and their personnel.141 The Court's jurisdiction may also be 
invoked when a party is dissatisfied with the decision of the ap-
propriate administrative organ of a specialized agency.142 The 
140. American jurisprudence has in recent years exhibited strong support for the in-
corporation of equity into international law. For example, the Tentative Draft No. 1 of the 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED), in the section on 
Sources of International Law, comment m states: "Resort to principles of equity, in the sense 
of accepted notions of what is fair and just, is a general principle of law common to major 
legal systems and as such it may be invoked as incorporated into international law." 
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LA w OF THE UNITED STATES 29-30 (Tent. Draft 
No. 1, 1980). The comment distinguished this form of equity from the "power, conferred 
on the International Court of Justice in Article 38 (2) of the Statute ... to decide cases 
ex aequo et bono." Id. 
141. G.A. Res. 957, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 30, U.N. Doc. A/2909 (1955). Art. 
11 lays down the possibility of challenging judgments of the Tribunal before the ICJ through 
request for advisory opinions. In addition, a similar procedure is provided by the Statute 
of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization (established as early 
as 1919 and which later became the first specialized agency related to the United Nations). 
In the leading case of Administrative Tribunal of l.L.O. (Judgments of the Administrative 
Tribunal of the l.L.O. upon Complaints made against the UNESCO), 1956 I.C.J. 77 (Judg-
ment of Oct. 23), the Court quoted article XII of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal 
authorizing a request for an advisory opinion when the organization "challenges a decision 
of the Tribunal confirming its jurisdiction, or considers that a decision of the Tribunal is 
vitiated by a Fundamental Fault in the procedure followed .... " Id. at 84. The Court con-
cluded that: 
[T]here would appear to be no compelling reason why the Court should not 
lend its assistance in the solution of a problem confronting a specialized agency 
of the United Nations authorized to ask for an Advisory Opinion of the Court. Not-
withstanding the permissive character of Article 65 of the Statute in the matter 
of advisory opinions, only compelling reasons could cause the Court to adopt in 
this matter a negative attitude which would imperil the working of the regime 
established by the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal for the judicial protec-
tion of officials. 
Id. at 86. 
142. Cf Appeals from Decisions of the Council of ICAO by virtue of Article 84 of the 
Chicago International Civil Aviation Convention (1944), Art. II, Sec. 2 of the International 
Air Services Transit Agreements of 1944, and the Council's Rules for the Settlement of 
Differences. A party may appeal "to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal agreed upon with the other 
parties to the dispute or to the l.C.J." Id. cf e.g., the case of Appeal Relating to the Jurisdic-
tion of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46 (Judgment of Apr. 18). 
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possibility of resorting to the International Court of Justice in 
disputes between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and 
heads of other organizations and their personnel, is a novelty which 
could have paved the way to new fields of jurisprudence. Never-
theless, difficulties have hindered its further development.143 
The matter calls for a special analysis in both matters of pro-
cedure and substance, but for the purpose of this survey it may 
suffice to state that the procedure is rather unsatisfactory and calls 
for serious improvement.144 The same applies to the scope of com-
petence of the Administrative Tribunals and the applicable substan-
tive law.145 The most unsatisfactory feature of the protections and 
safeguards afforded by the two tribunals, however, is the marked 
difference in regard to officials subject to the jurisdiction of the 
ILO Tribunal and those subject to the U .N. Administrative 
Tribunal's jurisdiction. This difference prompted me to appeal for 
an improved procedure but particularly for the unification of the 
systems of review - in brief, the establishment of one administrative 
tribunal for all organizations in the United Nations family. 146 The 
goal would be equal protection of personnel employed by all 
organizations. 
I am gratified to note that the Secretary-General and the Ad-
ministrative Committee on Co-ordination were requested to "study 
the feasibility of establishing a single administrative tribunal for 
the entire system.147 This request led to further consultations and, 
though the task is not an easy one in view of the special interests 
of each organization, it is to be hoped that in the long run one ad-
ministrative tribunal will be established as the result of the same 
idea which led to the creation of the International Civil Service 
Commission.148 Thus, in this domain too, the Court and its members 
143. Cf Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Ad-
ministrative Tribunal, 1973 l.C.J. 166, 172 (Judgment of July 12). 
144. Cf Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the U.N. Administrative Tribunal, 
1982 l.C.J. 325, 342 (Judgment of July 20). 
145. Cf id. at 351, the Statute of the ILO Administrative Tribunal particularly with 
reference to its Article XII, and Article 11 of the U.N. Administrative Tribunal. 
146. Cf my Declaration as President of the Court, Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction 
of the !CAO Council (India v. Pak.), supra note 142, at 214. 
147. G.A. Res. 119, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 201, U.N. Doc. A/34/495 (1978); G.A. 
Res. 438, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 274, U.N. Doc. A/34/771 (1979). Cf also, Applica-
tion for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, supra 
note 144, at 423-33. 
148. This offered me an opportunity to stress the need for a revision of the whole system 
of regulations guiding UN internal activities and I stated that "it may be timely on that 
occasion to review and consolidate the internal law of international organizations in view 
of the conflicts and inefficacy of a number of regulations and rules in the systems." Id. at 434. 
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proved helpful in shaping the development of the law or even the 
creation of new branches of it. 
VI. Conclusion 
This brief survey has demonstrated how the Court has gone 
beyond the parameters initially drawn for it in 1945, or earlier in 
1922, in its efforts to develop the law and apply it to a wider, more 
universal international community.149 The Court has done far more 
than administer justice, - it has enriched the law by developing it 
and making it progress. 
The question is occasionally posed whether by so doing the 
Court has acted ultra vires.150 After all, the Court is charged with 
deciding, applying, and interpreting the law. In the process, the pro-
cedure and practices of the Court have been subjected to criticism. 
It may be that on some occasions, the Court's decisions, instead 
of developing the law, actually moved it a step backward, but these 
occasions were undoubtedly exceptions. 
In developing the law, the Court has not acted ultra vi res. 
Despite protests to the contrary, every judge sitting on the bench 
applies the law and necessarily develops it. By making his contribu-
tion to a judgment, he may cause the law to take a step backward. 
Nevertheless, he does not, nor is he meant to, read the law 
mechanically; he is a thinking judge. The mere process of thinking 
and of understanding the law requires synchronizing the law with 
the dynamics of international life. The mere existence of the Court, 
and other institutions for judicial settlement of disputes, implies 
the necessity of judges interpreting the law and construing it as 
they understand it. In this manner, the Court has made substan-
tial contributions to the development of the corpus J·uris gentium.151 
Thus, no reasons exist why the Court should not continue to develop 
149. In this development, the law has found it necessary to adapt to the current blurr-
ing of international borders, which has resulted in a more universal international community. 
Cf Jessup, supra note 11; Tunkin, International Law in the International System, 147 COL-
LECTED COURSES HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 56 (1975). 
150. In Namibia, for example, the court held its actions clearly were not ultra vires, 
in that the United Nations, through its competent organs, including the ICJ, must be seen 
above all as an institution competent to pronounce, in that capacity, on the conduct of States 
with respect to their international obligations and competent to act accordingly. (emphasis 
added). Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 49-50. 
151. Advisory opinion on Reparations, Reservations and Namibia; the decisions on the 
formation of customary law and several other decisions of the Court. The Barcelona Trac-
tion opinion's impact upon the subsequent development of the law on State responsibilities 
as elaborated by the International Law Commission is a clear demonstration of the Court's 
impact on corpus juris gentium. 
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the law and move it forward in a closer relationship with inter-
national life. The image of the Court as one living in splendid isola-
tion has virtually disappeared, and the communication gap between 
the Court and the international community has been gradually over-
come. It is the Court's jurisprudence that offers ample evidence 
to this effect. This should, in turn, have the necessary impact on 
States. 
By common effort the rule of law should be ensured in the in-
terest of every State and the international community as a whole. 
We must make law a rational instrument of rational beings. The 
Court's success or failure is conditioned by commitment to the 
judicial resolution of international disputes. In the final analysis, 
the lawmakers' and the Court's ultimate clients determine the 
Court's influence on the development of international law. It is their 
task, in the interests of themselves and of the international com-
munity as a whole, to implement and ensure the rule of law. Thus, 
they would enhance the role of the Court and its stature. 
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